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Letter dated 25 September 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to address Your Excellency to make reference to the high-level briefing of the Security Council to be held on 26 September 2018 under the agenda item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security: non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction".

In this regard, I am pleased to transmit herewith, on behalf of the member States of the Non-Aligned Movement, the positions of the Movement on this important subject, as renewed as recently as April 2018, during the 18th midterm ministerial meeting of the Movement, held in Baku (see annex).*

Moreover, I respectfully request that the present letter and its annex be circulated as a document of the Security Council distributed among its members.

I trust that this contribution by the Non-Aligned Movement will enrich the deliberations of the Security Council on this issue.

(*Signed*) Samuel **Moncada**
Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations

* The annex is being circulated in the language of submission only.

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Annex to the letter dated 25 September 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Excerpts from the section on "Disarmament and International Security", select paragraphs relating to "Maintenance of international peace and security: non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction", as included in the Final Document adopted during the 18th mid-term ministerial meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Baku on 6 April 2018

"201. The Ministers *reiterated* their continued concern over the current difficult and complex situation in the field of disarmament and international security. In this regard, they called for renewed efforts to resolve the current impasse in achieving nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects.

202. The Ministers *expressed* their deepest concern over the immediate, indiscriminate, and massive death and destruction caused by any nuclear weapon detonation and its long term catastrophic consequences on human health, environment, and other vital economic resources, thus endangering the life of present and future generations. They reiterated further their deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, and in this context reaffirmed the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law. They stressed the need to address this issue in the context of the efforts aimed at the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free world and in this regard, they noted continuing relevant international efforts, including the three International Conferences on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons, held respectively in Norway in 2013, in Mexico in 2014 and in Vienna in 2014, and the important role of the humanitarian initiative in promoting progress towards nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. They *reiterated* the call in General Assembly Resolution 72/251 for the commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons.

203. Reaffirming the absolute validity of multilateral diplomacy in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, the Ministers *reiterated* their determination to promote multilateralism as the core principle of negotiations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. In this regard, they *welcomed* the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 72/48 on Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation.

204. The Ministers *reiterated* their strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and in this context, underlined that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the UN Charter, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues.

205. The Ministers *reaffirmed* the Movement's principled positions on nuclear disarmament, which remains its highest priority, and on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects. They *stressed* the importance of ensuring that efforts aimed at nuclear non-proliferation are parallel to simultaneous efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament. They expressed concern at the threat to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons sand of their possible use or threat of use.

206. The Ministers *reiterated* their deep concern over the slow pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament and the lack of progress by the Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS) to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals in accordance

with their relevant multilateral legal obligations. They *reaffirmed* the importance of the unanimous conclusion of the ICJ that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. They *called upon* the NWS to fulfill their multilateral legal obligations on nuclear disarmament and to implement the unequivocal undertaking they provided in 2000 and further reiterated in 2010 so as to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons. They *emphasized*, in this regard, the urgent need to commence and to bring to a conclusion negotiations on comprehensive and complete nuclear disarmament without any further delay.

207. The Ministers *acknowledged the* significant contribution towards realizing the objective of nuclear disarmament made by NAM Member and Observer States, including through the voluntary renunciation of the possession of nuclear weapons by Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa and Ukraine;

208. The Ministers, while noting the statements by NWS of their intention to pursue actions in achieving a world free of nuclear weapons, *reaffirmed* the need for urgent concrete actions by the NWS to achieve this goal in accordance with their nuclear disarmament legal obligations and commitments. They *reaffirmed* the importance of the application of the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability by NWS in all measures related to the fulfillment of their nuclear disarmament obligations.

209. The Ministers *remained* deeply concerned at the strategic defense doctrines of the NWS, including the "NATO Alliance Strategic Concept", which not only set out rationales for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, but also maintain unjustifiable concepts on international security based on promoting and developing military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies. They therefore *strongly called upon* them to exclude completely the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from their military and security doctrines.

210. The Ministers *reiterated*, with concern, that improvements in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons as provided for in the military doctrines of some NWS, including the United States Nuclear Posture Review, violate their legal obligations on nuclear disarmament, as well as the commitments made to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies and contravene the negative security assurances provided by the NWS. They *stressed* once again that these improvements as well as the development of new types of such weapons violate also the commitments undertaken at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and at the NPT Review Conferences by the NWS.

211. The Ministers *welcomed* the multilateral efforts towards nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Moreover, they *took note* of the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 7 July 2017 at the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination. It is hoped that, when entered into force, the Treaty would contribute to furthering the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

212. The Ministers *emphasized* that progress in nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects is essential to strengthening international peace and security. They *stressed* the importance of ensuring that efforts aimed at nuclear non-proliferation are parallel to simultaneous efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament. They *reaffirmed* that efforts toward nuclear disarmament, global and regional approaches and confidence building measures complement each other and should, wherever possible, be pursued simultaneously to promote regional and international peace and security. Nevertheless, they *stressed* that nuclear disarmament, as the

highest priority established by SSOD-I and as a multilateral legal obligation, should not be made conditional on confidence building measures or other disarmament efforts.

213. The Ministers *reaffirmed* the importance and the relevance of the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) as the sole specialized, deliberative body within the UN multilateral disarmament machinery and reiterated their full support for its work. They commended the UNDC for the successful adoption of the consensus recommendations on "Practical Confidence-Building Measures in the Field of Conventional Weapons" by the Commission in 2017. They *expressed* regret that since 2000 the UNDC was unable to reach agreement on the "Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" due to the lack of political will and inflexible positions of some Nuclear-Weapons States, despite NAM's constructive role and concrete proposals throughout the deliberations. They further *called upon* UN Member States to display the necessary political will and flexibility, in order to enable the Commission to agree on "Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" in its current cycle.

214. The Ministers *reaffirmed* the importance of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, and reiterated their call to the CD to agree on a balanced and comprehensive program of work by, inter alia, establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament as soon as possible and as the highest priority. They *emphasized* the necessity to start negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, without further delay, on further effective nuclear disarmament measures, in particular a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention that sets, inter alia, a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time.

215. The Ministers *expressed* their appreciation for the efforts undertaken, in particular by those representatives of Member States of the Non-Aligned Movement who served as the Presidents of the CD for the commencement of its substantive work, including negotiations. They noted the various proposals on the program of Work of the CD as contained in the documents CD/1864, a decision adopted by CD on 29 May 2009 but not implemented, CD/1933/Rev.1, CD/1952, and CD/1955 which were presented successively by Algeria, Egypt, Iran and Iraq between 2009 to 2013 sessions. They called on the CD to agree by consensus on a balanced and comprehensive programme of work without any further delay taking into account the security interests of all States. In this regard, the Ministers *reaffirmed* the importance of the principle contained in the final document of the SSOD-I that "The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage". They agreed to continue coordination of efforts at the NAM Chapter in Geneva.

216. The Ministers *called* for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on further effective nuclear disarmament measures to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons, including, in particular, on a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons. They further *called* for urgent compliance with legal obligations and the fulfillment of the commitments undertaken on nuclear disarmament.

218. The Ministers *welcomed* UN annual meetings and activities for the commemoration of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September since 2014, as outlined in resolution 68/32. They *invited* Member States, the UN system and the civil society, including non-governmental organizations, academia, parliamentarians, the mass media and individuals, to

commemorate and promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons through all means of educational and public awareness-raising activities. They also *expressed* their commitment to work together with the objective that the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons becomes one of the effective ways to focus international public attention on the dangers of nuclear weapons, the necessity for their total elimination and the advantages of nuclear disarmament for development as well as for international peace and security.

219. Moreover, the Ministers *underlined* the importance of UNGA resolutions 68/32, 69/58, 70/34, 71/71 and 72/251 as a roadmap on nuclear disarmament and accordingly stressed the need for an active participation of NAM Member States in all activities related to their implementation, including enhancing public awareness and education on this issue. They commended all efforts aiming at promoting the implementation of these resolutions, including those undertaken by the Group of 21 in the Conference on Disarmament and the NAM Chapter in Vienna.

220. The Ministers *called* for further international, regional and national efforts aimed at advancing the goal of nuclear disarmament. In this regard, they noted with appreciation the efforts of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and also noted the adoption of a "Special Declaration on Nuclear Disarmament" at its Second Summit, held in Havana, Cuba, on 28 and 29 January 2014, a "Special Declaration on the Urgent Need for a Nuclear Weapon Free World" at its Third Summit, held in Belen, Costa Rica, on 27 and 28 January 2015, a "Special Declaration on the commitment to advance in the multilateral negotiations on Nuclear Disarmament", at its Fourth Summit, held in Quito, Ecuador, on 27 January 2016, and further noted the adoption of a "Special Declaration on Nuclear Disarmament" at its Fifth Summit, held in the Dominican Republic, on 25 January 2017.

223. The Ministers *reaffirmed* that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, they *called for* the early commencement of negotiations on effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding security assurances to all NNWS by all the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances as a matter of high priority. They *expressed* concern that despite long standing requests by NNWS to receive such legally binding universal assurances, no tangible progress has been achieved in this regard.

224. The Ministers *stressed* the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all NWS, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. They *reiterated* that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the NWS, to nuclear disarmament would be essential. In this context, the ratification of the CTBT by Myanmar and Swaziland was welcomed.

225. The Ministers *recalled* the commitments made towards the full implementation of the New START Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States, as well as the need for follow-up measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals. They *stressed* that reductions in deployments and in operational status, although they may contribute to risk reduction, cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. In this context, they *called on* the United States and the Russian Federation to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to such cuts, to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, thus contributing to the fulfillment of their nuclear disarmament obligations and facilitating the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date.

226. The Ministers *took note of* the successful completion of the commitments, by the Russian Federation and the United States, under the New START treaty, and *called* for the renewal of the commitments agreed within the framework of said Treaty. Nonetheless, they *expressed* their grave concern over the US Nuclear Posture Review and its National Security Strategy, which goes against legal obligations and undertakings to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and threatens international peace and security.

227. The Ministers *continued* to be concerned over the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense systems and the threat of weaponization of outer space which have, inter alia, contributed to the further erosion of an international climate conducive to the strengthening of international security. The abrogation of the ABM Treaty brought new challenges to international peace and stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. They *remained* seriously concerned at the negative security consequences of the deployment of strategic missile defense systems which could trigger an arms race(s) and lead to the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons.

228. The Ministers *recognized* the common interest of all humankind and the inalienable, legitimate sovereign rights of all States in the exploration and use of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes, and reconfirmed their stand to oppose and reject any act denying or violating it and *emphasized* that prevention of an arms race in outer space, including a ban to deploy or use weapons therein, would avert a grave danger for international peace and security. They further *emphasized* the paramount importance of strict compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements relevant to outer space, including bilateral agreements, and with the existing legal regime concerning the use of outer space. They also *reemphasized* the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work in the CD, inter alia, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, taking note of the joint Russian- Chinese initiative of a draft treaty on the "Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects" (PPWT) presented in the Conference on Disarmament on 12 February 2008 and in 2014. They *noted* that this initiative is a constructive contribution to the work of the Conference, and is a good basis for further discussion toward adopting an international legally-binding instrument. In this context, they *noted* the adoption of General Assembly resolution 72/27 on no first emplacement of weapons in outer space with a view to ensuring its exclusive peaceful use. They also *welcomed* the adoption of General Assembly resolution 72/250 on "Further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space", which calls for the establishment of a United Nations Group of Governmental Experts to consider and make recommendations on substantial elements of an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including, inter alia, on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space. They further urged all Member States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space as an essential condition for the promotion of international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. They *called for* the promotion and strengthening of international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

231. The Ministers *remained convinced* of the need for a multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive, transparent and non-discriminatory approach toward the issue of missiles in all its aspects as a contribution to international peace and security. They expressed their support for efforts to be continued within the UN to explore further the issue of missiles in all its aspects. In this regard, they *emphasized* the contribution of peaceful uses of space technologies, including space launch vehicle

technologies, to human advancement, such as for telecommunications and data gathering on natural disasters. They also *emphasized* the need to keep the issue of missiles in all its aspects on the agenda of the UN General Assembly and *welcomed* that the Panel of Governmental Experts established in accordance with Resolution 59/67 successfully concluded its work in 2008 and submitted its report to the 63rd session of the UN General Assembly. While welcoming the consensus adoption of the UNGA decision 69/517 on "Missiles", they encouraged follow up efforts to further examine the elements contained in the conclusions of the Secretary-General's Report A/63/176. Pending the achievement of such a universal approach related to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, any initiative to address these concerns effectively and in a sustainable and comprehensive manner should be through an inclusive process of negotiations in a forum where all States could participate as equals. They *stressed* the importance of the security concerns of all States at regional and global levels in any approach to the issue of missiles in all its aspects.

232. The Ministers *believed* that the establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free zones (NWFZs) created by the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba, the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone treaty as well as Mongolia's Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Status are positive steps and important measures towards strengthening global nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. They *reiterated* that in the context of NWFZs, it is essential that NWS should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zone. They *urged* States to conclude agreements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned with a view to establishing new NWFZs in regions where they do not exist, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-I) and the Principles and Guidelines adopted by the UN Disarmament Commission in 1999. They also *called upon* all the nuclear-weapon States to ratify related protocols to all treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, withdraw any reservations or interpretative declarations incompatible with their object and purpose, and respect the denuclearization status of these zones.

233. The Ministers *welcomed* the anniversaries of all treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. In this regard, they welcomed the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which created the first nuclear-weapon-free zone established in the world, and *recognized* its contributions to the cause of disarmament and non-proliferation. Similarly, they *welcomed* the twentieth anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty) on 27 March 2017, and recognized the importance of its full and effective implementation to preserve the Southeast Asian region as a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

234. The Ministers *welcomed* the 25th Anniversary of the declaration of Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status on 25 September 2017 and commended Mongolia's efforts towards a world free of nuclear weapons. They also *recalled* the convening of the Third Conference of the States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Established Nuclear Weapon Free Zones and Mongolia held in New York, on 24 April 2015, the Ministers *called* on the States parties and signatories to those Treaties to implement further ways and means of co-operation among themselves, their treaty agencies and other interested States. They *expressed* their support for Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and its policy aimed at institutionalizing that status.

235. The Ministers *reiterated* their full support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. As a priority step to this end, they *reaffirmed* the need for the speedy establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East in accordance with the Security Council Resolution 487 (1981) and paragraph 14 of the Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) and the

relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus. They called upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the fulfillment of the proposal initiated by Iran in 1974 for the establishment of such a zone. Pending its establishment, they *demanded* on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT without precondition and further delay, to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) full-scope safeguards according to Security Council Resolution 487 (1981) and to conduct its nuclear related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime. They called for the earliest implementation of relevant IAEA resolutions on "Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East". They *expressed* great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capability by Israel which poses a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighboring and other States, and *condemned* Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals. In this context they also *condemned* the statement made by the then Prime Minister of Israel on 11 December 2006, related to the possession of nuclear weapons by Israel. They *urged* the continued consideration of the issue of Israeli nuclear capabilities in the context of the IAEA, including at the General Conference. They were of the view that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allow one party to threaten its neighbors, and the region. They also *called for* the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear related scientific or technological fields to Israel. In this regard, they *expressed* their serious concern over the continuing development whereby Israeli scientists are provided access to the nuclear facilities of one NWS. This development will have potentially serious negative implications on security in the region as well as the reliability of the global non-proliferation regime.

236. The Ministers *took* into consideration the draft resolution tabled by the Syrian Arab Republic, on behalf of the Arab Group, before the Security Council on 29 December 2003 on the establishment of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. They *welcomed* the initiative presented in 1990 by the Arab Republic of Egypt on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, and its initiative presented before the 68th session of the United Nations General Assembly on 28th September 2013 containing implementation steps in support of the establishment of the Zone. They also *stressed* that necessary steps should be taken in different international fora for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East. They *took note* with appreciation of the letters sent, in 2013 and 2014, to the United Nations Secretary-General, renewing the support for the establishment of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction, reflected in the note A/68/781 by the Secretary-General, by: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.

237. The Ministers *reiterated* their support for the efforts of the Arab Group in Vienna to keep the question of the Israeli nuclear capabilities under consideration of the General Conference of the IAEA.

238. The Ministers *underscored* the Movement's principled position concerning non-use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity of any State. In this regard, they *condemned* the Israeli attack against a Syrian facility on September 6, 2007, which constitutes a flagrant violation of the UN Charter and *welcomed* Syria's cooperation with the IAEA in this regard.

241. The Ministers of NAM States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while *reaffirming* the package of agreements of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT, and recognizing the crucial role of the NPT in nuclear disarmament, nuclear non- proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, were of the view that the "Conclusions and Recommendations for Follow-on actions" of the 2010 Review Conference of the NPT, represent an outcome that can be built upon and further enhanced in the near future, to fully address the priorities of the Movement, in particular to realize a world free from nuclear weapons. They *called upon* NWS to implement fully and effectively their obligations under the Treaty, in particular in the area of nuclear disarmament, and the outcomes of its Review Conferences, in particular the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences.

242. The Ministers of NAM States Parties to the NPT *stressed* the importance of the review of the operation of the Treaty in the framework of the NPT Review Conferences and in this context *emphasized* that the inclusion of the Review Part of the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference as an opinion of the President and not as a consensus language should not be considered as a precedent to be followed in the future without prejudice to the prerogatives of the Review Conference.

243. The Ministers of NAM States Parties to the NPT *reiterated* the importance of the full implementation of the action plans adopted by the 2010 NPT Review Conference on nuclear disarmament, on nuclear non-proliferation, on peaceful uses of nuclear energy and on the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. They *expressed concern* at the lack of agreement on a number of key priorities of NAM States Parties to the NPT and *agreed* to continue their collective efforts in pursuing the realization of their priorities at the NPT Review Conferences.

244. The Ministers of NAM States Parties to the NPT *welcomed* the adoption by consensus of a detailed plan of action on "the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East" in the "Conclusions and Recommendations for Follow-on actions" of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

245. While *expressing deep concern* over the long delay in the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the Ministers of NAM States Parties to the NPT strongly urged the United Nations Secretary-General and the three cosponsors of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East to fully implement it, without any further delay, to achieve on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction adopted by the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Recalling the consensus decision contained in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference on convening, in 2012, a Conference on the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East, they expressed their profound disappointment and serious concern that the conference was not convened in 2012 as scheduled. They *underscored* that the failure to convene the Conference is contrary to the letter and spirit of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and contradicts and violates the collective agreement of the States Parties contained in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. They *strongly rejected* the arguments presented by the Conveners for not convening the Conference on schedule.

246. NAM States Parties to the NPT *expressed* their disappointment that as a result of the opposition by the US UK and Canada at the concluding session of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, consensus on measures regarding the process to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction was not achieved. They further underscored that efforts related to the establishment

of the Zone should be undertaken in accordance with the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East as well as the relevant United Nations Resolutions. The Ministers *reiterated* in this regard the common position of the NAM States Parties to the NPT as reflected in working paper NPT/CONF.2015/WP.49 presented at the 2015 Review Conference, and *called* for concrete and urgent steps for its implementation;

247. The Ministers of NAM States Parties to the NPT *reiterated* their call for the firm commitment by all States Parties to the Treaty to the full and indiscriminate implementation of all the provisions of the Treaty. They further called for the full implementation of the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty, particularly an unequivocal undertaking by the NWS to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, they *underlined* the agreement by consensus at the 2010 Review Conference of the NPT, which reaffirmed the previous agreements, on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons; the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT; and on providing effective, unconditional and non-discriminatory universal legally binding security assurances to all NNWS parties to the Treaty, which would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

248. The Ministers of NAM States Parties to the NPT *called upon* the NWS to fully comply with their commitments not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NNWS parties to the Treaty or NWFZs at any time or under any circumstances, pending the conclusion of a legally binding instrument on security assurances.

249. The Ministers *reaffirmed* the inalienable right of developing countries to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. They continued to note with concern that undue restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology, for peaceful purposes persist. They again *emphasized* that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. Non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States, and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries for their continued sustainable development. They *expressed* their full confidence in the impartiality and professionalism of the IAEA and *strongly rejected* any politically motivated attempts by any State to politicize the work of the IAEA, including its technical co-operation programme, in violation of its Statute, as well as any pressure or interference in the Agency's activities which could jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the IAEA and the inalienable right of developing countries to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

250. The Ministers of NAM States Parties to the NPT *emphasized* once more that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty. They *stressed* that this right constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. In this connection, they *confirmed* that each country's choices and decision in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international co-operation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.

251. The Ministers *stressed* the need for the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in developing countries, which contributes to the attainment of their respective national sustainable development goals, and the full

respect for their right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. They *underlined* particularly the responsibility of developed countries to facilitate, to the fullest extent possible, the transfer, to developing countries, of nuclear equipment, materials, scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes. They also encouraged the IAEA to continue supporting developing countries in realizing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in particular through its technical cooperation programme, which is essential for the promotion and transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful uses.

252. The Ministers *recalled* the successful conclusion of nuclear negotiations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and E3/Eu+3, resulting in the finalization of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on 14 July 2015 adopted by Security Council resolution 2231. The Ministers *called for* its full implementation by all its participants and *underlined* that this agreement showed once again that dialogue and diplomacy are the most appropriate means to resolve such issues, as the Movement has always advocated.

253. The Ministers *took note* of the adoption, through a vote, in 2010 and 2011, by the IAEA Board of Governors, of three proposals of assurance of supply mechanisms in the framework of the multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. They *highlighted* that this issue should be conducted through wide, integral and transparent consultations and negotiations, focusing on its technical, legal, political and economic implications, before any further decision is taken about this complex and sensitive matter. They *emphasized* that decisions should be made by consensus, with the participation of all IAEA member States, and any proposal from IAEA must be consistent with its Statute, without any prejudice to the inalienable right of its member States to research, develop and use for peaceful purposes of nuclear sciences, in all its aspects, including the inalienable right of each State Party, if it so decides, to develop, for peaceful purposes, a full national nuclear fuel cycle in accordance with its rights and obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

254. The Ministers, *emphasizing* the importance of the positive role played by the Non-Aligned Members in the IAEA, *stressed* the necessity that all members of the IAEA strictly observe its Statute. They *stressed* that any pressure or interference in the Agency's verification process, which could jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the Agency, should be avoided. They *recognized* that the IAEA is the sole competent authority for verification of compliance with the obligations under the respective safeguard agreements of the Member States. They also *reaffirmed* that a clear distinction has to be made between the legal obligations of Member States under their respective safeguards agreements and their voluntary undertakings, in order to ensure that such voluntary undertakings are not turned into legal safeguards obligations. Bearing in mind the Agency's responsibility in protecting safeguards' confidential information and given the undesirable incidents of leakage of such information, they *emphasized* the need for strengthening the regime for the protection of safeguards confidential information.

255. The Ministers *reaffirmed* the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities - operational or under construction- poses a great danger to human beings and the environment, and constitutes a grave violation of international law, principles and purposes of the UN Charter and regulations of the IAEA. They *recognized* the urgent need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

256. The Ministers *affirmed* the need to strengthen the Radiological Safety and Protection Systems at facilities utilizing radioactive materials as well as at radioactive waste management facilities, including the safe transportation of these materials. They *reaffirmed* the need to further strengthen existing international regulations relating to safety and security of transportation of such materials. They noted the efforts of the IAEA in this regard, including through the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety which was unanimously endorsed by the IAEA General Conference. While *reiterating* the need to take appropriate measures to prevent any dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes, they called for effective implementation of the Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste of the IAEA as a means of enhancing the protection of all States from the dumping of radioactive waste on their territories.

257. The Ministers *recognized* that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety and nuclear security rests with the individual States. In that sense, they *underlined* that States with nuclear power programs have a central role in their own countries in ensuring the application of the highest standards of nuclear safety and the responsibility for providing a timely, transparent and adequate response to nuclear accidents in order to minimize their consequences. They *stressed* the need for a rapid, timely, continuous, reliable and transparent dissemination of information on nuclear accidents with significant trans-boundary radiological effects in accordance with relevant international conventions.

258. The Ministers *emphasized* the need to improve national, regional and international preparedness and response to nuclear accidents and called for a strengthened role of the IAEA in emergency preparedness and response, including through assisting Member States, upon their request, on emergency preparedness and response to nuclear accidents, promoting capacity building, including education and training in the field of crisis management.

259. The Ministers *emphasized* that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and nuclear security must not be used as a pretext or leverage to violate, deny or restrict the inalienable right of developing countries to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

260. The Ministers *emphasized* that the IAEA is the sole inter-governmental organization within the UN system with the mandate and expertise to deal with the technical subjects of nuclear safety and nuclear security.

261. The Ministers *stressed* that the issues related to proliferation, should be resolved through political and diplomatic means, and that measures and initiatives taken in this regard should be within the framework of international law, relevant conventions and the UN Charter, and should contribute to the promotion of international peace, and security.

262. The Ministers of NAM States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) *reaffirmed* that the possibility of any use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins as weapons should be completely excluded, and the conviction that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of humankind. They *recognized* the particular importance of strengthening the Convention through the resumption of the multilateral negotiations for a legally binding Protocol dealing with all Articles of the Convention, in a balanced and comprehensive manner, including through verification measures bearing in mind that the lack of such verification regime poses a challenge to the effectiveness of the Convention, and urged the party rejecting negotiations to reconsider its policy. They *expressed* satisfaction that currently 180 States are Parties to the Convention, and also *stressed* the importance of universal adherence to the Convention and, in this context, welcomed the recent accession of Angola, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominica, Guinea, Liberia, Nepal, State of

Palestine, and Vanuatu to the Convention. They *reiterated* their call to promote international cooperation for peaceful purposes, including scientific-technical exchange. They *underlined* the importance to maintain close coordination among the NAM States Parties to the Convention and highlighted that the BTWC forms a whole and that, although it is possible to consider certain aspects separately, it is critical to deal with all of the issues interrelated to this Convention in a balanced and comprehensive manner.

263. The Ministers of NAM States Parties to BTWC *welcomed* the active participation by NAM States Parties in the 8th BTWC Review Conference and the BTWC Meeting of States Parties (MSP), held respectively from 07–25 November 2016 and 04–08 December 2017, in Switzerland, to advance their positions in this Convention. They welcomed the consensus outcome adopted at the 2017 MSP under the able Chairmanship of India. They *reaffirmed* the importance of strengthening the full effective and balanced implementation of all articles of the convention and, in this regard, *reiterated* their commitment to work in the inter-sessional period, in particular on Cooperation and Assistance, with a particular focus on strengthening cooperation and assistance under article X, review of developments in the field of S and T related to the convention, strengthening national implementation, assistance, response and preparedness, and institutional strengthening of the convention.

264. They also *welcomed* their key role in the adoption of the important decisions related to the implementation of Article X of the BTWC, especially by emphasizing the need for enhancing international cooperation, assistance and exchanges in toxins, biological agents equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, bearing in mind the Action Plan on the implementation of Article X submitted by the NAM States Parties at the Sixth Review Conference, and the additional NAM States Parties' proposal on an institutional mechanism for international cooperation and compliance with Article X presented more recently. They further *encouraged* the BTWC States Parties to implement the Article X, as set forth in the Final Documents of the seventh and eighth BTWC Review Conferences. They *reiterated* the importance to strengthen the operationalization of cooperation database which was established by the Seventh Review Conference to ensure that specific, timely and concrete offers of cooperation under Article X are provided by States Parties in the database and to consider the ways to improve reporting on this issue, taking into account the current lack of effectiveness of the referred database and welcomed the VIII Review Conference decision regarding the maintenance of a Sponsorship Programme, funded by voluntary contributions from States Parties, in order to support and increase the participation of developing States Parties in the meetings of the inter-sessional programme in the framework of the BTWC.

265. The Ministers of NAM States Parties to the BTWC *emphasized* the importance of the BTWC role in the international legal architecture related to WMD and in particular in the total prohibition on all biological and toxin weapons. They further *emphasized* the need for enhancing, without restrictions, international cooperation and assistance and exchanges in toxic biological agents equipment and technology for peaceful purposes without any discrimination, in conformity with the Convention. They *reaffirmed* that the respective mandates of this Convention and other international organizations should be respected, while utilizing the experiences of the relevant multilateral organizations dealing with human and animal health on issues that are of direct relevance to the Convention, and that no actions should be taken to undermine the convention and/or interfere with its mandate.

266. The Ministers of NAM States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) *welcomed* the successful conclusion of its Third Review Conference. They reiterated that a transparent, holistic and balanced approach shall prevail in follow-up to the recommendations adopted by the Third Review Conference, and encouraged

the continuation of discussions aimed at drafting a document on the Future Priorities of the OPCW, with a view for it to be considered during the Fourth Review Conference. They *invited* all States that have not yet signed or ratified the Convention to do so as soon as possible with a view to its universality. They *reaffirmed* that the effective contribution of the Convention to international and regional peace and security can be enhanced through its full implementation, and in this context also encouraged all States Parties that have not yet done so to engage with the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on the steps that need to be undertaken for the national implementation of the Convention. They *reaffirmed* the importance of international cooperation in the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under CWC. They *reiterated* their call on the developed countries to promote international cooperation for the benefit of States Parties through the transfer of technology, material and equipment for peaceful purposes in the chemical field and the removal of all and any restrictions that are contrary to the letter and spirit of the Convention. They *recalled* that the full, balanced, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of all provisions of the Convention, in particular economic and technical development through international cooperation, is fundamental to the achievement of its object and purpose. They also *reaffirmed* the need to respect the principles included in the Convention, and called upon States parties to the CWC to avoid the polarization and politicization of the work of the Organization, while encouraging States Parties to continue working cooperatively in the interest of consensus.

267. The Ministers of the NAM States Parties to the CWC *welcomed* those States that have successfully destroyed all declared Category 1 Chemical Weapons. They further welcomed that, upon completion of the destruction of the remaining Category 2 Chemical Weapons in Libya, on 23 November 2017, the total amount of destroyed Category 2 Chemical Weapons has reached 100%. They *expressed* their serious concern that certain possessor States parties did not meet their obligations regarding the deadlines for the total elimination of chemical weapons and that nearly 4% of declared chemical weapons still remained to be destroyed as of 31 October 2017. They therefore *urged* the remaining possessor State Party to take every necessary measure to ensure its compliance with its "Detailed plan for the destruction of Chemical Weapons remaining after the final extended destruction deadline of 29 April 2012", in the shortest time possible, in order to uphold the credibility and integrity of the Convention.

268. The Ministers of the NAM States Parties to the CWC *underlined* that the use of chemical weapons and toxic chemicals as a weapon anywhere by anyone and under any circumstances is reprehensible and completely contrary to the provisions of the Convention, legal norms and standards of the international community. They *acknowledged* the total elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons and the constructive cooperation of the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the implementation of the provisions of the Convention. They also *commend* the cooperation of the Syrian Arab Republic in implementing the relevant Executive Council of the OPCW decisions, in particular decisions taken by Executive Council with regard to destruction of Syrian chemical weapons production facilities.

269. The Ministers of NAM States Parties to the CWC *reaffirmed* that the implementation of the Article X of the CWC on assistance and protection against chemical weapons make a significant contribution to countering the threats of use of chemical weapons. They *stressed* the importance of achieving and maintaining a high level of readiness of the OPCW to provide timely and needed assistance and protection against use or threat of use of chemical weapons, including assistance to the victims of chemical weapons. They *highlighted* the need for all States Parties, particularly those in a position to do so, to contribute to the Voluntary Fund of

Assistance to ensure that the capacity of the Technical Secretariat is able to provide, upon the request of States Parties, timely, adequate and effective assistance, with a view to responding to the growing demands from States Parties.

270. The Ministers of NAM States Parties to the CWC *welcomed* the decision on Components of an agreed framework for the full implementation of Article XI adopted at the 16th Conference of the States Parties to the CWC and *considered* it as a positive step towards achieving the goal of the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article XI. They *attached* high importance to the adoption of a Plan of Action for the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of all the provisions of Article XI. They *welcomed* the proposal of the Action Plan of Article XI presented by the NAM CWC States and China, which is currently being discussed at the OPCW. They *looked forward* to the continuation of Article XI consultations with a view to further deliberate the Document of the facilitators as soon as possible for negotiations by delegations in order to adopt a decision in this regard. They *welcomed* the holding of the annual review and evaluation workshop of the components of an agreed framework for the full implementation of article XI and *stressed* the importance of the active participation of States Parties in the annual workshops. In this context, and taking into account the importance of adopting an Action Plan for the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article XI, they considered that States Parties to the CWC should present concrete recommendations and proposals before the Fourth Review Conference. To that end, they *called upon* NAM States Parties to the CWC to continue engaging in discussions towards this end, within the framework of the NAM Chapter in The Hague.

271. The Ministers of NAM States Parties to the CWC, while paying due respect to the chemical weapons victims and their families, *declared* their firm conviction that international support to provide special care and assistance to all victims suffering the effects of exposure to chemical weapons is an urgent humanitarian need and that the States Parties to the Convention as well as the OPCW should pay urgent attention to meeting these needs. In this context, they *welcomed* the decision adopted at the 16th Session of the Conference of States Parties to establish an International Support Network for Victims of Chemical Weapons and a voluntary Trust Fund for this purpose. In this regard, they *expressed* their appreciation to States Parties for their contributions to the Voluntary Trust Fund for the Network for Victims of Chemical Weapons, and encouraged all States Parties to consider actively contributing to the Trust Fund.

272. The Ministers once again *condemned* the Israeli military aggression against the Gaza Strip in 2009 and July and August 2014 and the occupying power's indiscriminate shelling and bombing of Palestinian civilian areas and *expressed* their grave concern over the reported use in civilian areas of harmful and potentially fatal incendiary weapons, such as white phosphorous. In this regard, they *reiterated* their call for a thorough investigation of this serious matter by relevant bodies under the appropriate international conventions and agreements.

273. The Ministers *regretted* unsubstantiated allegations of non-compliance with relevant instruments on weapons of mass destruction and *called on* States Parties to such instruments that make such allegations to follow procedures set out in those instruments and to provide necessary substantiation for their allegations. They *called upon* all States Parties to the respective international instruments to implement fully and in a transparent manner all their obligations under these instruments.

274. The Ministers *expressed* their satisfaction with the consensus among States on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. They *welcomed* the adoption by consensus of the General Assembly Resolution 72/42 entitled "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction"

and underlined the need for this threat to humanity to be addressed within the UN framework and through international co-operation. While *stressing* that the most effective way of preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction is through the total elimination of such weapons, they *emphasized* that progress was urgently needed in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation in order to help maintain international peace and security and to contribute to global efforts against terrorism. They *called upon* all Member States to support international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. They also *urged* all Member States to take and strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture.

275. While *noting* the adoption of resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008) and 1977 (2011), 2055 (2012) and 2325 (2016) by the Security Council, the Ministers *underlined* the need to ensure that any action by the Security Council does not undermine the UN Charter and existing multilateral treaties on weapons of mass destruction and of international Organizations established in this regard, as well as the role of the General Assembly. They further *cautioned* against the continuing practice of the Security Council to utilize its authority to define the legislative requirements for Member States in implementing Security Council decisions. In this regard, they *stressed* the importance of the issue of non-state actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction to be addressed in an inclusive manner by the General Assembly, *taking into account* the views of all Member States.

276. Mindful of the threat posed to humankind by the existing weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons and underlining the need for the total elimination of such weapons, the Ministers *reaffirmed* the need to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and therefore *supported* the necessity of monitoring the situation and triggering international action as required. In this regard, the Ministers *welcomed* the adoption of the General Assembly Resolution 72/23 entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament".

277. The Ministers, while staying committed to the cause of prohibiting the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction, *welcomed* the adoption of General Assembly Resolution A/RES/72/23 "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament", adopted on December 4, 2017, *reiterated* the adherence of their countries to and *called* on the international community to abide by the goals and principles set out therein."

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United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2366 (2017), by which the Council established the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia and requested me to report on its activities every 90 days. The report covers the period from 21 July to 26 September 2018.

II. Main developments

2. Since the swearing-in of Iván Duque Márquez as President on 7 August, the new Government has taken detailed stock of the country's situation, organized the new Administration to strengthen inter-agency coordination, made institutional appointments and prepared policies on a range of key national matters. Under the Constitution, the President is to present the Government's four-year national development plan by 15 November, which will cover the full extent of the Administration's agenda and serve as a basis for public investments.

3. In August, the President appointed Miguel Ceballos as High Commissioner for Peace, Emilio José Archila as High Counsellor for Post-Conflict, responsible for the reintegration of former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia — People's Army (FARC-EP) members, and Nancy Gutiérrez as Minister of the Interior. On 17 September, those three officials were appointed as members of the Commission for the Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Implementation of the Final Agreement. Mr. Archila was appointed as the representative of the Government on the National Reintegration Council, together with the Director of the Agency for Reintegration and Normalization. Mr. Archila was also designated to lead the secretariat of the National Commission on Security Guarantees, among other functions. I welcome the appointments to these three important bodies established under the Peace Agreement and urge the prompt resumption of their activities.

4. During his inauguration, in subsequent weeks and at a joint press conference on 20 September with my Special Representative for Colombia and Head of Mission, Jean Arnault, the President reiterated several commitments that have a bearing on the Mission's mandate. He emphasized his firm support for a more effective reintegration of former FARC-EP members engaged in the peace process. Given the persistent pattern of killings of community leaders in zones of conflict, on 23 August the

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President, together with the Inspector General, announced the adoption of a broad "pact for life and the protection of social leaders and human rights defenders" and instructed the Ministry of the Interior to urgently formulate a policy based on the commitments set forth in the pact. In line with the Mission's own considerations, as mentioned in my previous report (S/2018/723), the President emphasized the need for more focused and tightly coordinated actions by State agencies in bringing development, security and the rule of law to the areas affected by conflict. He underscored his commitment to social dialogue and travelled extensively throughout the country to meet local authorities, the business community and civil society.

5. On 30 August, the President sent a letter addressed to the Security Council and to me with a joint request by the Government and the People's Alternative Revolutionary Force (FARC) to extend the mandate of the Mission. I am grateful for the confidence thus placed in the United Nations by both parties to the Peace Agreement. I am convinced that the Council's support, as reaffirmed in its resolution 2435 (2018), by which it renewed the Mission's mandate for an additional year until 25 September 2019, remains one of the key assets of the peace process.

6. During the reporting period, and especially since the new Government took office, there have been developments relating to the peace process and the implementation of the Peace Agreement, as set out below.

Risks to the reintegration process

7. On 6 September, the Mission issued a press release in which it expressed its concern over the possible implications for the reintegration process of the departures of several former FARC-EP commanders from the territorial areas for training and reintegration in the south-eastern region. Some of them have cited concerns about their physical and legal security as a motivating factor for leaving the areas where some 1,500 former combatants are undergoing reintegration. Regardless of their motivations, this development has underlined the continued fragility of the peace process, owing in particular to the persistence of violence in the zones of conflict linked mainly to criminal groups. Some of those groups include former FARC-EP members commonly referred to as "dissidents" who have abandoned the peace process. Reintegration in Colombia is facing daunting challenges, as described in my previous reports, and which include weak or absent State institutions, the impact of illegal economies and the relentless efforts by armed groups to lure former FARC-EP members into their ranks. The latest developments confirm what I stressed exactly a year ago in my final report on the work of the United Nations Mission in Colombia (S/2017/801), namely that the effective reintegration of former FARC-EP members is central to the overall peace consolidation agenda.

Congressional developments

8. In early September, the Senate and the Chamber of Representatives each elected its Peace Commission, whose mandate is to support the peaceful resolution of conflict, social dialogue and reconciliation. On 10 September, the Senate Peace Commission, with the Mission's support, made a first visit to a territorial area for training and reintegration, in San Vicente del Caguán, Caquetá Department, to ascertain the state of reintegration in that region, to interact with former FARC-EP members, neighbouring communities and representatives of the Armed Forces and to affirm their support for the reintegration effort. The visit reassured former FARC-EP members and enhanced the senators' understanding of the pending challenges. It is hoped that the visit will be followed by others, which will also have the Mission's support. Field visits by members of the Commission from the Chamber of Representatives, most recently to Antioquia Department, have also been valuable.

9. Following the visit, the Senate Peace Commission, the High Commissioner for Peace and the High Counsellor for Post-Conflict agreed to work together on reintegration challenges.

Constitutional Court review of peace-related legislation

10. On 16 August, in an important decision, the Constitutional Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute on the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, while providing clarification thereon. In particular, the Court found that the sentences that the Special Jurisdiction was authorized to impose of five to eight years of special restrictions on freedom were compatible with participation in politics (provided that the sentenced individual fulfilled a series of conditions), while stricter sentences were not. Overall, the decision amounts to a clearer and more solid legal framework for the work of the Special Jurisdiction. This will, in turn, contribute to greater legal certainty in the implementation of the Peace Agreement, for the individuals subject to its jurisdiction and for victims.

11. The Court also declared constitutional Decree Law 902, which outlines measures for the implementation of comprehensive rural reform, and Legislative Act No. 5 of 29 November 2017, which upholds the State's monopoly on the legitimate use of force and prohibits support for civilian armed organized groups.

12. In the Peace Agreement, the signatories agreed to submit legislation adopted by Congress through the fast-track procedure for a prior and automatic review by the Constitutional Court. With its recent decisions, the Court has completed its work in this regard and has undertaken, in total, the judicial review of six constitutional amendments, four statutes and 35 decrees related to the implementation of the Agreement. By doing so, it has undoubtedly contributed substantively to the peace process. The adjustments and clarifications that it has made during its review have sought to reconcile differing views of the Agreement and the outcome has brought key provisions into line with constitutional norms.

Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition

13. The United Nations system, at the request of the Government, continues to provide important technical and operational support to all three components of the Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition: the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, the Truth Commission and the Special Unit for the Search for Persons Deemed as Missing.

14. Equipped with a solid legal framework, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace opened its first cases. Case 001 is focused on kidnappings by FARC-EP; case 002 on violent events involving multiple parties in Tumaco, Department of Nariño, from 1990 to 2016, when communities of Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities were particularly affected; and case 003 on extrajudicial executions by State agents. The Special Jurisdiction has held hearings with senior representatives of the former FARC-EP and current and retired senior officials of the armed forces and national police, often with the participation of victims. Several civilian third parties, including two former members of Congress, have also brought cases that will be heard under the Special Jurisdiction. A wide variety of State and non-State institutions have also submitted information to the Special Jurisdiction documenting cases and patterns of violence.

15. Earlier in 2018, FARC expressed concern about the situation of the assets that the group had handed over to the Government in August 2017 to be used for the purpose of providing reparation to victims. In August and September, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace requested information from various competent authorities to ensure that the assets were used for the originally intended purposes.

16. As part of its examination of the case of FARC leader Seuxis Pausias Hernández Solarte (alias Jesús Santrich), who is under an extradition order from the United States of America, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace is considering evidence provided by the Office of the Attorney General. On 12 September, the Special Jurisdiction requested from the Office all evidence in its possession.

17. Further to the concerns made public by the Mission on the whereabouts of several former FARC-EP commanders, on 12 September the Special Jurisdiction for Peace requested the 31 members of the former FARC-EP General Command to provide a report on their contributions to truth and reintegration, including support for the location of missing persons.

18. Decree 1393, of 2 August, established the internal structure and functions of the Unit for the Search for Persons Deemed as Missing during the armed conflict. The Special Jurisdiction for Peace, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other organizations working on behalf of families of the disappeared called for adequate support to be provided to this effort of the transitional justice system.

Referendum on corruption

19. The fight against corruption was a key theme throughout the electoral campaign. On 26 August, a referendum on seven proposals to address corruption and promote transparency was held at the initiative of several political parties and with the support of the President. While the results missed the threshold of approval by a slim margin, they nevertheless showed a high level of popular support for tackling corruption. As a result, the President invited all political parties to support a citizens' compact against corruption. A package of reforms, including the seven proposals submitted to the referendum, was negotiated among political parties and submitted to Congress on 18 September. I note that those reforms are consistent with the provisions of the Peace Agreement that, in the chapter on security guarantees, call for the Government to prevent and control corruption, in particular by regulating the integrity, performance and assets of public officials.

Substitution of illicit crops

20. On 19 September, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Government launched a report on illicit crop monitoring for 2017. By the end of 2017, the country's coca cultivation had reached record levels of 171,000 ha, with a potential production of 1,379 tons of pure cocaine. Illicit economies, which include mining and drugs, are a continued source of violence in the country and a threat to the peace process.

21. Meanwhile, as reported by UNODC, 77,659 families have signed voluntary substitution agreements under the National Comprehensive Programme for the Substitution of Illicit Crops, committing themselves to eradicating approximately 49,000 ha of coca cultivation. As at 20 August, around 20,845 ha of coca crops had been eradicated under those agreements. The armed forces have assisted in the voluntary eradication of an additional 5,374 ha. Despite serious challenges, including the killing of community members and threats against leaders of the substitution programme, the continued participation of communities demonstrates that they can spearhead such an effort. While the Government is formulating a comprehensive policy on drug cultivation, it has reiterated its commitment to families who have already signed voluntary substitution agreements.

Negotiations between the Government and the National Liberation Army

22. On 1 August, the sixth round of talks between the Government and the National Liberation Army (ELN) concluded in Havana. The negotiating teams reported that,

although they did not reach definitive agreements, progress was made, in particular with regard to designing a process for the participation of society in building peace.

23. With respect to future negotiations, ELN has called for continuity with regard to both the negotiating agenda agreed to in 2016 and the negotiating format, including the participation of guarantor and supporting countries.

24. Discussions on the continuation of the talks with the new Government were affected by the kidnapping, in early August, of seven uniformed personnel and two civilians by ELN in two separate events. The groups were released on 5 and 12 September, respectively. A minor kidnapped on 7 September was released on 19 September.

25. After deliberating for a month, the President announced on 8 September that he was prepared to renew discussions with ELN, provided that the group release all hostages under its control and cease all acts of violence. ELN rejected those preconditions and insisted that those issues be discussed at the negotiating table. In the absence of direct negotiations, the continued direct communication between the Government and ELN is welcome. The Government has made it clear that it expects a cessation of all violence; the ELN, for its part, has stated that it aims to bring about substantive change based on a broad social dialogue. The two goals are not incompatible. As I stated during my visit to Colombia at the beginning of 2018, full social participation requires a situation exempt from violence and conducive to an effective and respectful dialogue. I invite the two sides to explore further this potential for convergence and to bring about a process that promptly delivers benefits to the Colombian society as a whole.

III. Mission tasks

A. Socioeconomic and political reintegration

26. The process of economic reintegration is clearly lagging behind other dimensions of reintegration. As I indicated in my previous report (S/2018/723), the fundamental goal of providing income-generating opportunities to some 14,000 former combatants is far from being realized, as illustrated by the fact that only 17 projects have been approved, of which only 2 are currently funded. Meanwhile, dozens of initiatives led and mainly funded by former FARC-EP members are at various stages of implementation in the territorial areas for training and reintegration and new settlements, with varying levels of success. As shown in several cases, many of the initiatives can be turned into viable income-generating ventures if provided with better access to technical and marketing advice, land and overall support from the Government, local authorities and the private sector, among others.

27. While the payment of monthly allowances and the provision of other early reintegration services, including the provision of food in the territorial areas for training and reintegration, to former FARC-EP members are continuing, over the past few weeks the new Government has been taking stock and developing its own approach. Some of its conclusions are consistent with the lessons identified in my previous report: (a) the importance of ensuring that regional and local authorities are empowered and, along with the private sector and other actors, actively engaged in the reintegration process; (b) the need to bring the reintegration of former FARC-EP members closer to the development of communities; and (c) the value of linking reintegration strategies to the work done under another pillar of the Peace Agreement, the development programmes with a territorial focus. A territorial and community-based approach is particularly appropriate given the increased dispersal of former FARC-EP members outside the territorial areas for training and reintegration. This

approach is consistent with the aspirations of FARC and the framework implementation plan, as well as the policy on reintegration adopted in June. The functioning of the National Reintegration Council must be improved in order to ensure that reintegration is rooted in local realities and opportunities. Now that the new members of the Council have been appointed, it is of utmost importance that economic reintegration activities resume on a larger scale and at a faster pace than before.

28. Taking into account the period of transition between the two administrations, the Mission has redoubled its efforts to support swift income-generating activities drawing on extrabudgetary funding from the Department of Political Affairs trust fund and additional contributions from donors. In total, the initiatives support 47 microenterprises by former FARC-EP members in all 25 territorial areas for training and reintegration and in 22 new settlements, in both urban and rural settings. Nine of the microenterprise projects are led by women, and gender considerations are ensured in all initiatives that are supported.

29. As part of the effort to bolster reintegration, the Mission has agreed with the Resident Coordinator, the High Commissioner for Peace and the FARC leadership to prepare a joint proposal to be submitted to the Peacebuilding Fund. The proposal will address socioeconomic reintegration and reconciliation and be implemented by several United Nations agencies.

Political reintegration

30. As mentioned in my previous report, FARC representatives were sworn into 8 of the 10 congressional seats allocated to the party under the Peace Agreement. The allocation of the seats that were not taken by FARC leaders Iván Márquez (who did not present himself to be sworn in) and Jesús Santrich (who was in detention pursuant to an extradition request) is still under discussion by the relevant institutions. The four FARC senators and four representatives are serving on key congressional committees covering issues relating to constitutional affairs, the budget, peace, agriculture, health and gender. FARC legislators have proposed and supported draft legislation related to aspects of the Peace Agreement.

B. Legal guarantees

31. During the transition to the new Government, the Mission continued to work cooperatively with the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace and FARC. This tripartite approach to legal guarantees has been effective and I hope that its continuation will help to bring agreed solutions to outstanding issues.

32. As at 30 August, approximately 13,000 former FARC-EP members had been accredited by the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace and 12,773 of them had been notified of and provided with their accreditation, an increase of 150 since my previous report. The increased dispersal of former FARC-EP members, which was described in the previous report, continues to complicate the tripartite efforts of FARC, the Office of the High Commissioner and the Mission to locate these individuals and inform them of their accreditation.

33. The Office of the High Commissioner for Peace continued to review, with FARC, the list dated 15 August 2017 of former FARC-EP members: 24 individuals were excluded from the list and 33 were accredited.

34. At the end of August, 232 accredited former FARC-EP members remained in prison. The Special Jurisdiction for Peace has opened some cases related to those individuals, as well as to some 250 others designated as "peace advocates", largely

made possible by the implementation, within the Special Jurisdiction, of the Independent System for Advice and Defence, and by legal support provided by the international community and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This represents a small increase over the figures in my previous report as a result of recent new accreditations of former FARC-EP members in prison.

35. It is very important that the Independent System for Advice and Defence be adequately resourced and staffed in order to fulfil its responsibilities in terms of the provision of legal guarantees and reintegration. The previous Government approved the decree for its establishment, but it was the new Government that approved the funds for its functioning. The funds must be made available as soon as possible, thereby permitting the System to be staffed with some 30 lawyers in the next few months, at a time when demand for the System has increased sharply.

36. In addition, as previously reported, FARC has consolidated a list of some 1,000 additional former FARC-EP members. The Office of the High Commissioner for Peace received the list on 10 August. The list includes people who are recognized by FARC as former FARC-EP members, but who do not appear in the list of 15 August 2017. Most of them come from areas affected by continuing security challenges and where the integration of the individuals into the process could be beneficial. As such, I hope that this matter will be treated by the new Government as a priority.

C. Security guarantees

Security of former members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia — People's Army

37. The military and police forces continue to secure the area around all territorial areas for training and reintegration. New settlements of former FARC-EP members outside those areas continue to expand and some of them are located in areas exposed to the influence of illegal armed groups. Their security requirements highlight the importance of a wider effort to extend security to the broader zones of conflict.

38. Close protection by the Specialized Subdirectorate for Security and Protection of the National Protection Unit remains a key element of the security measures implemented for former FARC-EP members. During the period under review, an additional 56 bodyguards, including 2 women, were hired. The recruitment of a further 46 bodyguards would meet the target of 1,200 as set out in the Peace Agreement.

39. At the national, regional and local levels, the Tripartite Protection and Security Mechanism, with the participation of the Police Unit for Peacebuilding, the National Protection Unit and the Mission, continued to operate during the transition period and remains the main mechanism for dialogue and monitoring of the protection of and security measures for former FARC-EP members. The performance of the Police Unit and National Protection Unit within this mechanism is commendable. The Mechanism is strengthening its capacity to respond to specific risks faced by former FARC-EP female members and has effectively integrated gender focal points for FARC, the Police Unit and the Mission into its structure. Local FARC focal points, supported by the Mission, are playing a significant role in enhancing understanding of and ensuring adequate institutional responses to local security challenges.

40. Outside the scope of those security measures, nine former FARC-EP members in the process of reintegration were killed during the reporting period, bringing the total number killed since the signing of the Peace Agreement to 71. Deteriorating security conditions for former FARC-EP members living outside the territorial areas for training and reintegration were starkly exposed by the tragic events in El Tarra,

Norte de Santander Department, where 10 people, including four former FARC-EP members, were killed on 30 July.

41. The Special Investigation Unit of the Office of the Attorney General continues to be responsible for investigations into the killings of former FARC-EP members. It has pointed out that three quarters of those killings are concentrated in five departments: Nariño (16 victims), Antioquia (14 victims), Cauca (12 victims), Caquetá (8 victims) and Norte de Santander (7 victims). In 34 cases, the Unit reported significant progress in its investigations, with 17 instigators or perpetrators arrested. Of these, 15 cases involved dissident groups, 7 involved private individuals, 6 were attributed to ELN, 4 cases were attributed to the Clan del Golfo criminal group, 1 involved local criminal organization and 1 case remains under investigation. According to the Investigation Unit, the principal motives behind the attacks are related to territorial control (21 cases) and revenge (3 cases). Other motives identified are revenge for prior grievances, internal differences within territorial areas for training and reintegration, refusal to join a criminal organization and extortion. It is key to ensure that the Unit broadens its territorial presence, particularly as it is expanding its investigations into the killings of social leaders.

42. The statistics from the Special Investigation Unit confirm the need to pay special attention to the security situation in and around certain territorial areas for training and reintegration in the Departments of Nariño, Antioquia and Cauca. Other incidents have occurred in the territorial areas in the Departments of Arauca and Putumayo, where attacks have taken place, including within the perimeter of the territorial areas. Armed groups and dissidents have been observed in the surrounding areas.

Security guarantees for communities, human rights defenders and social leaders

43. As mentioned herein, on 23 August, at a meeting in Apartadó, Antioquia Department, the President and the Inspector General announced the adoption of the pact for life and the protection of social leaders and human rights defenders and instructed the Ministry of the Interior to follow up urgently with policy guidelines.

44. The sense of urgency is driven by recent developments. All sources, including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Colombia, attest that killings of and threats against social leaders and human rights defenders continue unabated. According to an early warning from the Office of the Ombudsman in February 2018, the killings and threats affect 12 of the 32 departments in the country. This same alert identifies the multiple issues behind the killings, including the victims' involvement in defending land and natural resources; in implementing parts of the Peace Agreement, in particular the coca substitution programme and the formulation of rural development plans; in land restitution and the return of displaced persons; in defending their land against private interests; in denouncing drug dealing, the presence of illegal armed actors and the use of children and adolescents in marginalized urban areas; in protesting against specific investments of public resources; and in political participation. Reversing this trend is critical to protecting human rights and preserving spaces for social actors to uphold their rights.

45. The investigation carried out by the Inspector General, which coincides with the analysis by the Office of the Ombudsman, identifies three factors: control of territories for the drug trade; large infrastructure projects; and pressure on ethnic communities. These factors are present in several of the 12 departments most affected.

46. Most of the victims are members of local action boards, the most basic form of association officially recognized by the Constitution; leaders of indigenous communities and communities of Colombians of African descent; and leaders of coca substitution programmes.

47. As shown above, the persistent pattern of killings is relatively well defined in terms of its geographical scope, the people targeted and the typology of motivations. As I underscored in previous reports, there is a need for a proactive and integrated State presence in former conflict areas. A focused, coordinated and sustained effort by State institutions, as called for in the pact adopted in Apartadó and signed by the President, the Deputy Attorney General, the Inspector General, the Ombudsman and several governors, should be able to address this challenge forcefully.

48. In its current work to develop guidelines for the implementation of the pact, the Ministry of the Interior is finalizing its analysis of existing mechanisms for the protection of social leaders. These include the security guarantee round tables created in 2007, the National Protection Unit and the mechanisms recently established under the Peace Agreement such as the Intersectoral Commission for Rapid Response to Early Warnings to ensure an effective response to the Ombudsman's alerts, and the comprehensive programme for the protection and security of communities and organizations.

49. In the Mission's assessment, the early warnings issued by the Office of the Ombudsman have confirmed their value as a tool for prevention, risk analysis and raising awareness among institutions and the public at large. With regard to the Intersectoral Commission, it will be important to promote and improve inter-agency responses at the local level. The National Commission on Security Guarantees has a key role to play in bringing together all competent institutions at the highest level under the leadership of the President. It offers a platform for dialogue with civil society organizations and is a feature unique to the Colombian peace process.

50. The importance of a State-wide action plan to respond effectively to patterns of violence in zones of conflict cannot be overstated. Success in this area will have to be a key priority of the new Government and one of its main contributions to the consolidation of the peace process.

Early warnings by the Office of the Ombudsman

51. During the reporting period, the Mission monitored 13 early warnings issued by the Office of the Ombudsman in 16 municipalities, with repeated warnings in the Departments of Nariño, Chocó and Tolima. These warnings highlighted the presence of illegal armed groups and the resulting risk to social leaders and communities participating in the National Comprehensive Programme for the Substitution of Illicit Crops and development programmes with a territorial focus, both linked to the Peace Agreement. All 13 warnings pointed to specific risks to women, ethnic groups and children and were linked to gender and ethnic violence and to the recruitment of children under 18 years old into illegal armed groups. The warnings note that armed violence is affecting communities at large, including former FARC-EP members in the process of reintegration, leading communities and social organizations to demand effective government measures for stabilization and territorial security.

D. Cross-cutting issues

Gender mainstreaming and engagement with women's groups

52. The Vice-President, Marta Lucía Ramírez, who is responsible for leading the Government's gender agenda, stated her intention to maintain a regular dialogue with women's groups during an initial meeting in July and convened a Cabinet meeting to take this agenda forward on 28 August, emphasizing the economic empowerment of women and efforts to eliminate sexual violence. The Special High-level Forum of Women, established under the Peace Agreement, is working to strengthen its monitoring mechanism for the gender provisions of the Final Peace Agreement.

53. During the reporting period, as mentioned above, the gender technical working group of the National Reintegration Council strove to promote the gender-sensitive reintegration of female former FARC-EP members, among others with guidance for the implementation of the gender actions of the policy on reintegration adopted in June 2018 and technical support for the implementation of productive projects. There was progress in identifying and prioritizing women-led productive projects.

54. The security guarantees for women leaders and human rights defenders remain an issue of concern. The effective implementation of the recently launched Comprehensive Security Programme for Women Human Rights Defenders, and the corresponding action plan, offers an opportunity to address the differentiated risks and the responses that women require. In this respect, the national police are continuing their efforts in seven regions to improve their ability to respond to gender-based violence through improved training and coordination with local authorities, as well as gender awareness activities with respect to military personnel deployed in the territorial areas for training and reintegration.

55. In an effort to promote the meaningful political participation of women, a non-governmental organization, La Kolectiva, is working with FARC, the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) and donor countries to open a school for the exercise of citizenship and political advocacy for the reintegration of women former combatants. This initiative is under implementation in seven territorial areas for training and reintegration in the Departments of Antioquia and Cauca and provides education on the rights and obligations of citizenship and strategies for the promotion of women's rights and gender equality.

56. The Mission has been supporting dialogues among diverse actors at the local and regional levels to foster confidence-building and create spaces to exchange best practices on local peacebuilding. For example, in Nariño Department, the Mission, in coordination with UN-Women, supported a process of dialogue and reconciliation between women victims of the conflict and female former FARC-EP members, bringing together more than 32 former women combatants and representatives of regional victims' organizations. This initiative will be replicated in other locations, creating a network of women working for reconciliation.

57. Based on its experience throughout the country, the Mission has developed a guidance handbook on gender-sensitive verification for its staff. It has adopted a Mission-wide gender directive and continues to strengthen its dialogue with women's organizations at the national and local levels, including FARC women's groups in territorial areas for training and reintegration and respective local government bodies.

58. The Peace Agreement continues to be cited, rightly, as ground-breaking in terms of how gender is mainstreamed into its provisions. Nevertheless, its implementation remains a challenge, including with regard to security guarantees and reintegration. This challenge can be met only with greater prioritization and resources.

Ethnic perspectives

59. On 9 August, the second day of his term, the President met representatives of indigenous communities and committed himself to including a chapter on indigenous peoples in his national development plan. The need to address the situation of ethnic communities was highlighted by the killings of and high number of threats against ethnic leaders and the confinement and displacement of indigenous communities and communities of Colombians of African descent registered during the reporting period.

60. On 28 August, the Mission leadership met the High-level Forum of Ethnic Peoples established to monitor the implementation of the Final Peace Agreement and

engage with the Commission for the Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Implementation of the Final Agreement. The High-level Forum and the Mission have identified a joint work agenda that includes follow-up on ethnic indicators of the Framework Plan for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement with regard to reintegration and security guarantees. Reintegration-related monitoring will comprise the inclusion of an ethnic approach in productive projects; the promotion of conflict prevention on territorial issues; and reconciliation and dialogue between traditional authorities and the leadership of territorial areas for training and reintegration. With regard to security guarantees, joint efforts will focus on integration of ethnic considerations in the protection of communities, organizations and leaders in the zone of conflict. Provision of operational support to the High-level Forum will assist in fulfilling its functions and advancing the implementation of the ethnic chapter of the Peace Agreement.

Child protection

61. The Government's reintegration programme for children, entitled "A Different Path of Life", continued to be implemented under the coordination of the newly appointed presidential Counsellor for Human Rights. The Agency for Reintegration and Normalization and the technical working group on children of the National Reintegration Council have become more involved in supporting children in the programme who are now adults. Notwithstanding these advances, the number of cases in which children have not received adequate support for daily subsistence remains of concern. A decree is pending to clarify the Government's response to adolescents and young people who have decided to continue their reintegration within the territorial areas for training and reintegration, and the definition of a legal entity to guarantee the sustainability of and budget for the Government's reintegration programme for children.

62. There was no progress regarding day-care facilities for children of former FARC-EP members living in the territorial areas for training and reintegration. The lack of social inclusion programmes, such as preventive health, education, recreational and cultural activities, is also a challenge requiring a clear policy from the Government. There are also a growing number of cases related to former FARC-EP members, especially women, seeking to regularize the legal guardianship of their children. A special protocol for those cases may be required in the light of the implications for their reintegration.

63. The recent adoption by the Government of guidelines on the prevention of recruitment and sexual violence against children is a welcome development. It will be important to implement them in zones of conflict. To ensure their effectiveness, the guidelines should dovetail with existing frameworks and structures for community security guarantees as provided for in the Peace Agreement, including the early warning system.

Youth and peace and security

64. The Mission has adopted a strategy for the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2250 (2015) and 2419 (2018) on youth and peace and security, with a focus on the role of young people in reintegration and security guarantees. On reintegration, the Mission is continuing to facilitate visits to the territorial areas for training and reintegration by young entrepreneurs, civil society leaders and university students, focused on providing first-hand information about the reintegration process and identifying opportunities for supporting productive projects. For example, young entrepreneurs from the tourism sector who have participated in the visits are helping to promote the projects of former FARC-EP members through their travel agencies and social media. On security guarantees, the Mission is strengthening its dialogue

with youth leaders and organizations and young former FARC-EP members to better understand their specific security needs and concerns. The Mission is also working with the National Council for Peace and Reconciliation, established under section 3.4 of the Final Agreement, to promote increased engagement by young people with the territorial peace councils. In order to integrate a youth focus throughout its verification and liaison activities, the Mission has established a network of youth focal points throughout its regional and subregional offices.

Liaison and coordination

65. During the transition period, the Mission established relations with the new Administration, sharing its assessment of the peace process and emphasizing the need to devote full attention to the still fragile reintegration process. Initial dialogue with the High Commissioner for Peace, the High Counsellor for Post Conflict and the Minister of the Interior has been positive and productive.

66. The Mission has also continued its engagement with independent oversight institutions. It has strengthened its relationship with the Inspector General, who is increasingly active in support of the peace process, especially with regard to security guarantees for community and social leaders.

67. In an effort to create favourable conditions for reconciliation at the territorial level, the Mission has been supporting dialogue among diverse actors at the local and departmental levels to foster confidence-building and create spaces to exchange best practices on local peacebuilding. For example, the Mission has supported dialogue with local social leaders to help to understand the risks and regional dynamics related to protection and facilitate information-sharing with national authorities and competent institutions. Additional initiatives are under way with diverse actors, including former FARC-EP members, youth leaders, community action associations, universities, the armed forces and victims of the conflict.

68. The Mission has continued to promote the involvement of the private sector in the reintegration process. In the territorial area Llano Grande in Antioquia Department, the Mission facilitated an alliance between 14 private sector foundations to support social, educational and cultural programmes in the territorial area and the surrounding community. The Mission also sees great potential in the private sector supporting former FARC-EP members' productive projects through the provision of technical assistance, the development of business plans and the commercialization of products produced in the territorial areas for training and reintegration.

IV. Coordination with the United Nations country team

69. The Mission continues to work closely with agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations system on matters that relate to their specialized mandates, including through the liaison efforts of the Mission's gender, child protection and advisers on ethnic issues and joint thematic working groups on reintegration and security guarantees.

70. The United Nations country team, the Mission and relevant institutions continued to coordinate programming in support of the reintegration process. The United Nations multi-partner trust fund has allocated $9 million to socioeconomic reintegration interventions, in addition to support from bilateral donors. UNDP has been a strategic partner of the Mission in mobilizing, designing and implementing funds for micro-level income-generating reintegration projects for former FARC-EP members in the territorial areas for training and reintegration and new settlements. The World Food Programme, the International Organization for Migration, the Food

and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and UN-Women are providing technical assistance across nine territorial areas for training and reintegration, where collective projects have been approved, including ensuring a gender equality approach.

71. With regard to security guarantees, the Mission and United Nations agencies met representatives of the Government to explore specific actions to take forward the pact for life and the protection of social leaders and human rights defenders agreed upon in Apartadó. The Mission and the country team have also collaborated in efforts to strengthen the early warning system. In early September, OHCHR and the Mission co-organized a meeting with representatives of human rights platforms to strengthen joint coordination and cooperation on a shared peace and human rights agenda; this dialogue will be replicated at the regional level. In addition, the United Nations multi-partner trust fund and the Peacebuilding Fund have financed activities in more than 135 municipalities since late 2017, including support to local justice mechanisms, humanitarian demining and mine action, community infrastructure and community-based measures to reduce violence against women and children.

V. Mission structures

Mission planning, operations and support

72. During the reporting period, the Mission undertook a detailed analysis of evolving factors in the operating environment with potential implications for its mandate, deployment and geographical coverage. One factor considered was the increased dispersal of former FARC-EP members in new settlements across the country, as well as in some larger cities. Based on this analysis, the Mission slightly adjusted its deployment and the areas of responsibility assigned to its offices to ensure an effective, cost-efficient and flexible implementation of its mandate in the field. The changes complement the Mission's hub-and-spoke approach, which relies on greater mobility of staff operating from hub offices in urban centres, rather than on a larger number of stand-alone camps. The Mission has begun relocating local sites to hub locations, has closed high-cost remote camps and has identified office premises in new areas of operation. Once completed, the field redeployment process will result in the consolidation of Mission locations from 43 to 37 field sites, and an overall reduction in operational support requirements in deep-field locations. The Mission continues to work closely with counterparts to ensure full adherence to national and United Nations environmental standards.

73. Significant efforts were undertaken during the reporting period to advance the Mission's strategy on gender parity. Following a recent recruitment drive, 58 per cent of Professional-level field staff positions are filled by women and 65 per cent of field office teams are led by women. In addition, 28 of 111 international unarmed observers are women.

Safety and security

74. The residual risk levels after the implementation of the security risk management measures remain medium and low. However, there were several noteworthy security incidents and developments during the reporting period. In the first incident, FARC-EP dissidents forcibly entered a meeting of the FARC party in Norte de Santander Department; two Mission personnel were present and no participants were injured. As a result of new mines placed by illegal armed groups linked to drug trafficking, the number of civilian victims of anti-personnel mines in the first eight months of 2018 was 46, more than double the 18 registered during the same period in 2017. Activities of illegal armed groups in the Departments of Arauca,

Norte de Santander, Chocó, Cauca, Nariño and Antioquia pose indirect threats to United Nations personnel and operations. Lastly, the security recommendations in effect since the Hidroituango dam crisis remain in place as the situation remained largely unchanged.

Conduct and discipline

75. The Mission continues to hold regular training sessions for new and existing personnel. A campaign to raise awareness regarding the sexual exploitation and abuse policy, prohibited conduct and respect in the work environment is under way.

76. During the reporting period, five allegations of misconduct were reported to the Mission and are under investigation. There are no pending cases related to sexual exploitation and abuse.

VI. Observations

77. The present report is issued at the end of the first year of the Mission's mandate and the beginning of the new Administration. For the new Government, as well as for the United Nations, it is an opportunity to take stock of the progress made thus far in the peace process and draw some lessons for the future.

78. In my previous report (S/2018/723), which coincided with the culmination of the electoral process, I highlighted that the congressional and presidential elections of 2018 were recognized as the least violent and the most participatory in decades, making them one of the most tangible benefits of the peace process for society at large. While the peace process is not exempt from serious challenges, and it has been marked by political controversy since its inception, the relevance of the Peace Agreement for the country's future has grown.

79. The commitment of the new Government to applying itself to the implementation of the Peace Agreement, and the broad support that the Agreement enjoys from the opposition and independent parties, are testament to the increased support for the peace process today. In addition to the Government and political parties, several of the most important institutions of the State, including Congress, the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, the Office of the Inspector General and the Office of the Ombudsman, have supported and contributed to the implementation of key parts of the Agreement. If the viability of a peace process is judged by the way it fares through a change from the Government that negotiated and signed it to a new one, the steps taken by the President, as outlined herein, are promising. I am hopeful that Colombian institutions will continue to pursue what is at the core of the peace agenda: security, development and the rule of law in the areas affected by conflict; an effective system of truth, justice and reparation to the victims; and the essential commitments to those who laid down arms. I call upon the authorities to make available the resources necessary for those critical investments in the future of Colombia, with all possible support from the international community.

80. As evidenced by the more worrying developments referred to herein, including the expansion of illegal economies, the competition of criminal groups for territorial control and the persistence of violence, the challenges remain formidable. Nothing less than a determined mobilization by State institutions in alliance with civil society and communities will be up to the challenge of bringing stability and development to vast and remote areas that are prey to those interconnected threats. I am encouraged by the spirit of national consensus that has emerged in recent weeks around the protection of social leaders and efforts to combat corruption. I hope that the same search for consensus will extend to the other dimensions of this agenda. As the

President and his Government are formulating key policies, I hope in particular that the broad social dialogue in which he is engaged will enable him to forge a national consensus around a policy on illegal drugs, on which unfortunately so many farmers in the zones of conflict depend.

81. The resolution of the issues in the mandate of the Mission, including the reintegration of former FARC-EP members and the security guarantees for communities in areas most affected by conflict, is intimately linked to the challenges described above. The experience of the past year has shown how difficult these tasks are, and the number of leaders killed, as well as the frustration of many former guerrillas, stand as evidence of this. However, these tasks are not intractable. Some of the lessons learned have been outlined in past reports, as well as in the present one. They involve designing solutions much closer to the problems at hand, empowering and trusting local actors and having institutions respond faster and more coherently. I trust in particular that the signatories to the pact for life and the protection of social leaders and human rights defenders concluded in Apartadó on 23 August will deliver fully on their commitments.

82. The Mission aspires to contribute to those aims through its mandate and the presence of its staff throughout the zones of conflict, together with the United Nations system and the international community as a whole. I take this opportunity to acknowledge the extraordinary dedication that each and every member of the Mission has demonstrated under the committed and experienced leadership of my Special Representative. I take the recent request of the Government and the FARC party to renew the Mission's mandate as evidence of their commitment to seeing this process through to its successful conclusion, and of their trust that the Mission can contribute to this end. I am grateful once again to the Security Council for expressing its confidence in the peace process and the service that the Mission can render to it.

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Letter dated 27 September 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the sixtieth monthly report of the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (see annex), submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). The present report covers the period from 24 August to 23 September 2018.

As previously communicated to the Security Council, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has been analysing the information contained in a note verbale dated 10 July 2018 from the Syrian Arab Republic. The information consisted of responses to the non-exhaustive list of questions attached to a letter dated 10 April 2018 from the Director-General on the outstanding issues related to the declaration of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic. In that regard, I note that the analysis thereof has now been completed and, moreover, that most of the information provided by the Syrian Arab Republic had already been conveyed to the OPCW Secretariat.

I welcome the willingness of the OPCW Technical Secretariat to continue its engagement with the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic to clarify all gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies in its initial declaration and subsequent submissions. I reiterate my previous calls upon the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate with OPCW and, thereby, to provide the necessary assurance to the international community regarding the elimination of its chemical weapons programme.

On 6 July 2018, the OPCW fact-finding mission in the Syrian Arab Republic issued an interim report on the alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon in Duma on 7 April. On 7 August, the Secretariat received a note verbale from the Syrian Arab Republic in which the latter provided comments on the interim report. I note that the fact-finding mission continues to collect and analyse information with regard to that incident, and I look forward to the issuance of the final report in due course. I further note the continuing efforts by the fact-finding mission to translate and analyse the information provided by the Syrian Arab Republic with respect to four other alleged incidents.

Further to the decision taken by the Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction at its fourth special session, on 27 June 2018, the Director-General will provide a progress report on the implementation of the decision to the Executive Council at its eighty-ninth session, which will be held from 9 to 12 October 2018.

As I have stated before, there can be no justification for the use of chemical weapons. In this regard, I note with great concern recent statements, including in the Security Council, alleging plans for the possible further use of chemical weapons in Idlib. I reiterate that, beyond the immediate and unacceptable human toll that such an attack would take, it could lead to a further deterioration of the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic. I also reiterate my previous calls for unity in the Security Council to ensure that those who use, or have used, chemical weapons are held accountable.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

Annex

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

I have the honour to transmit to you my report entitled "Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme", prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of the decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 of the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), both dated 27 September 2013, for transmission to the Council (see enclosure). My report covers the period from 24 August to 23 September 2018, as well as the reporting requirements in Executive Council decision EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013.

(*Signed*) Fernando **Arias**

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Note by the Director-General

Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme

Background

1. In accordance with subparagraph 2(f) of the decision by the Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") at its Thirty-Third Meeting (EC-M-33/DEC.1, dated 27 September 2013), the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") is to report to the Council on a monthly basis regarding the implementation of that decision. In accordance with paragraph 12 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the report by the Secretariat is also to be submitted to the Security Council through the Secretary-General.

2. The Council, at its Thirty-Fourth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled "Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities" (EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013). In paragraph 22 of that decision, the Council decided that the Secretariat should report on its implementation "in conjunction with its reporting required by subparagraph 2 (f) of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1".

3. The Council, at its Forty-Eighth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled "Reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria" (EC-M-48/DEC.1, dated 4 February 2015) noting the Director-General's intent to include reports of the OPCW Fact Finding Mission in Syria (FFM), along with information on the Council's discussion thereof, as part of the monthly reporting pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). Similarly, the Council, at its Eighty-First Session, adopted a decision entitled "Report by the Director-General Regarding the Declaration and Related Submissions by the Syrian Arab Republic" (EC-81/DEC.4, dated 23 March 2016), noting the Director-General's intent to provide information on the implementation of that decision.

4. The Council, at its Eighty-Third Session, adopted a decision entitled "OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism Reports on Chemical Weapons Use in the Syrian Arab Republic" (EC-83/DEC.5, dated 11 November 2016). In subparagraph 12(a) of that decision, the Council decided that the Director-General shall "regularly inform the Council on the implementation of this decision and incorporate information regarding the implementation of this decision into his monthly reporting to the United Nations Security Council, through the United Nations Secretary-General, regarding EC-M-33/DEC.1".

5. This, the sixtieth monthly report, is therefore submitted in accordance with the aforementioned Council decisions and includes information relevant to the period from 24 August 2018 to 23 September 2018.

Progress achieved by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of Executive Council decisions EC-M-33/DEC.1 and EC-M-34/DEC.1

6. Progress by the Syrian Arab Republic is as follows:

(a) As stated in previous reports, the Secretariat has verified the destruction of all 27 chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) declared by the Syrian Arab Republic.

(b) On 17 September 2018, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted to the Council its fifty eighth monthly report (EC-89/P/NAT.3, dated 17 September 2018) regarding activities on its territory related to the destruction of its CWPFs, as required by paragraph 19 of EC M 34/DEC.1.

Progress in the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons by States Parties hosting destruction activities

7. As stated in previous reports, all of the chemicals declared by the Syrian Arab Republic that were removed from its territory in 2014 have been destroyed.

Activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to Executive Council decisions EC-81/DEC.4 and EC-83/DEC.5

8. During the reporting period, the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) continued its efforts to clarify all outstanding issues regarding the initial declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic in accordance with paragraph 3 of Council decision EC-81/DEC.4 and paragraph 6 of Council decision EC-83/DEC.5.

9. As stated in the previous report (EC-89/DG.1, dated 24 July 2018), on 10 July the Secretariat received a note verbale from the Syrian Arab Republic with responses to the questions attached to the Director-General's letter to the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Syrian Arab Republic, Dr Faisal Mekdad, dated 10 April 2018. These questions pertain to the chemical weapons-related activities conducted at the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC). An analysis of the information provided in the aforementioned letter has been completed. It was noted that most of the information provided through the letter dated 10 July 2018 had already been conveyed to the Secretariat. The Secretariat will continue its engagement with the Syrian authorities with a view to clarifying all gaps, inconsistencies, and discrepancies noted in its initial declaration and further submissions.

10. In accordance with paragraph 10 of Council decision EC-83/DEC.5, the Secretariat is in the process of planning the inspections at the sites identified by the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism in its third and fourth reports. The Secretariat also continues to monitor the security situation through the United Nations Department of Safety and Security to identify permissive security conditions for those inspections.

11. Pursuant to paragraph 11 of Council decision EC-83/DEC.5, the Secretariat is in the process of planning the next inspections to be conducted at the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the SSRC.

Other activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic

12. The United Nations Office for Project Services continues to provide support to the OPCW mission in the Syrian Arab Republic in accordance with the Tripartite Agreement.

13. As at the cut-off date of this report, one OPCW staff member was deployed as part of the OPCW mission in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Supplementary resources

14. As previously reported, the Trust Fund for Syria Missions was established in November 2015 to support the OPCW FFM and other remaining activities, such as those of the DAT. As at the cut-off date of this report, total contributions to this fund stood at EUR 17.2 million. Contribution agreements had been concluded with Canada, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Monaco, New Zealand, the Republic of

Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and the European Union.

Activities carried out with respect to the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria

15. Guided by Council decisions EC-M-48/DEC.1 and EC-M-50/DEC.1 (dated 23 November 2015), as well as by United Nations Security Council resolution 2209 (2015), the FFM continues to study all available information relating to the allegations of use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.

16. On 6 July, the Secretariat issued a Note entitled "Interim Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria Regarding the Incident of Alleged Use of Toxic Chemicals as a Weapon in Douma, Syrian Arab Republic, on 7 April 2018" (S/1645/2018, dated 6 July 2018 and Corr.1, dated 10 July 2018). On 7 August, the Secretariat received a note verbale from the Syrian Arab Republic that provided comments on the interim report. The FFM continues to collect and analyse information with regard to the alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon in Douma and will provide a final report on its findings in due course.

17. In July, the FFM requested and was provided with a number of documents by the National Authority of the Syrian Arab Republic pertaining to four reported incidents currently under investigation: two incidents in Kharbit Masasnah on 7 July 2017 and 4 August 2017, respectively, one incident in Al-Salamiyah on 9 August 2017, and another in Souran on 8 November 2017. The FFM is currently translating and analysing the information contained in these documents.

Activities related to the use of chemical weapons in Syria carried out by the Secretariat with respect to decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 of the Conference of the States Parties at its Fourth Special Session

18. The Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter "the Conference") at its Fourth Special Session adopted a decision entitled "Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use" (C-SS-4/DEC.3, dated 27 June 2018) which, inter alia, addressed the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. In paragraph 8 of the decision, the Conference encouraged the Director General to continue to provide regular updates on the FFM's operations, taking into account the need to protect the security and safety of Secretariat personnel.

19. In paragraph 10 of the decision, the Conference decided that the Secretariat shall put in place arrangements to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic by identifying and reporting on all information potentially relevant to the origin of those chemical weapons in those instances in which the FFM in Syria determines or has determined that use or likely use occurred, and cases for which the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism has not issued a report. The Conference further decided, in paragraph 12, that the Secretariat shall preserve and provide information to the investigation mechanism established by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 71/248 (2016), as well as to any relevant investigatory entities established under the auspices of the United Nations.

20. Pursuant to paragraph 24 of the decision, a progress report on the implementation of C-SS-4/DEC.3 will be issued to the Council at its Eighty-Ninth Session.

Conclusion

21. The main focus of the future activities of the OPCW mission in the Syrian Arab Republic will be on the activities of the FFM; the implementation of Council decisions EC-83/DEC.5 and EC-81/DEC.4, including declaration-related issues; annual inspections of the underground structures already verified as destroyed; and implementation of Conference decision C-SS-4/DEC.3.

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Identical letters dated 21 September 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) committed during the month of August 2018 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 38, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Amal **Mudallali**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-16516 (E) 091018 111018

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Annex to the identical letters dated 21 September 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Land violations committed in August 2018

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 August	0640 1130	Inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, several explosions and bursts of light- and medium-weapon fire were heard.
	1519	From a location near its south Rumaysh position inside occupied Palestinian territory, the Israeli enemy pointed the cannon of a Merkava tank towards an Observer Group Lebanon patrol that was on the other side, inside Lebanese territory.
3 August	1745	As the herder Hasan Zahra was tending a herd of livestock on the outskirts of Shab'a town, Birkat al-Naqqar district, an Israeli enemy patrol fired in the air towards him, but did not strike anyone. He was able to flee with his herd towards the town.
4 August	1200 1345	Inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, the sound of several bursts of light and medium automatic-weapon fire was heard coming from the perimeter of the Radar post.
6 August	0800	Inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the town of Yarun, between points B45(1) and B46, the Israeli enemy used an excavator to clear scrub. In the process, the excavator breached the technical fence without violating the Blue Line. At 1400 hours, as a Lebanese Army patrol was monitoring the work from the Lebanese side, members of the enemy patrol directed insults and offensive language at and armed and pointed their weapons towards the Lebanese Army patrol. This incident occurred in the presence a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) patrol. At 1600 hours, the Israeli enemy finished its work, and the excavator and the personnel left in the direction of occupied territory.
	1800 2020	On the outskirts of Marun al-Ra's and Aytarun, near point BP23, inside Lebanese territory, a fire broke out across a large area (approximately 2 km) of scrub and trees, causing a landmine that had been left behind by the Israeli enemy to explode.
7 August	1130	On the outskirts of Yarun, as a Lebanese Army patrol was near the Hadab al-Bustan post along the border with occupied Palestinian territory, the cannon of an Israeli enemy Merkava tank was pointed directly at the personnel of the Lebanese Army patrol.
9 August	1145 0300	On the outskirts of Yarun, opposite points B48 and B49, inside Lebanese territory, a fire broke out across a large area (approximately 100 dunums) of scrub and trees, causing two landmines that had been left behind by the Israeli enemy to explode.
13 August	1700	Inside occupied Palestinian territory, at the Duhayrah Gate position, as the Israeli enemy was firing live ammunition, bullets reached Lebanese territory and flew above homes in Duhayrah town.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	2300 2330	Inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, two flares were observed over the Radar position.
14 August	1020	Opposite the town of Rumaysh, as a routine Lebanese Army patrol along the Blue Line was inspecting the area between points B36 and BP14, inside Lebanese territory, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising 10 personnel, 1 Merkava tank and 2 Hummer vehicles arrived on the other side of the Blue Line. The enemy personnel pointed their weapons, the tank's cannon and the medium weapons attached to the Hummer vehicles towards the Lebanese Army patrol personnel. The enemy patrol also launched six smoke grenades, two of which fell in occupied Palestinian territory while the other four fell in Lebanese territory, causing two members of the Lebanese patrol to choke and setting fire to the area between the above-mentioned points. The fire extended into occupied territory. A patrol from the liaison unit of UNIFIL and members of the Civil Defence arrived at the scene, and the latter proceeded to extinguish the fire on the Lebanese side. A fire brigade from the occupied territories also arrived at the scene and extinguished the fire on the side of the occupied Palestinian territories.
15 August	1000	Opposite the town of Ramiya (points BP10 and BP10 (1)), an 11-person Israeli enemy patrol took up positions behind the earthen berm and pointed their weapons towards some Lebanese farmers who were working on their land. The patrol left in the direction of occupied territory at 1430 hours.
16 August	2230	From inside occupied territory, opposite Sahl al-Khiyam, near point B90, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles approached. Four soldiers disembarked and carried out maintenance work on the technical fence. They also directed searchlights towards Lebanese territory. The Israeli enemy completed the work at 2300 hours and the vehicles and soldiers departed towards occupied territory.
17 August	1100	Opposite the town of Kafr Killa, the members of an Israeli enemy patrol pointed machine guns towards a Lebanese Army patrol as it conducted routine reconnaissance activity along the border.
20 August	0825	Inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the town of Kafr Killa, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising two trucks, a winch crane, two pickup trucks and a Bobcat vehicle continued building the separation wall by putting into place 18 T-wall units between points B82 (1) and B82 (2). At 1100 hours, the enemy brought a Merkava tank to the Jabal al-Tayyarah position and pointed its cannon towards Lebanese territory. The tank was removed at 1300 hours. The Israeli enemy finished work at 1500 hours and the vehicles returned to occupied territory.
	0830	Inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the town of Aytarun, as an Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles, an excavator and two civilian pickup trucks was clearing scrub along the technical fence, a member of that patrol pointed a 12.7 mm gun attached to a Hummer vehicle towards Lebanese Army personnel.
	1100	As the Israeli enemy was completing construction work inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the town of Kafr Killa, the enemy brought in a Merkava tank and pointed its cannon towards Lebanese territory.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
21 August	0945	Several explosions were heard from inside the occupied Shab'a Farms.
	1135	
25 August	1500	On the outskirts of town, between points BP5 and B11 in Alma al-Sha'b, as a Lebanese Army patrol was reconnoitring an area along the border with the occupied Palestinian territories, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising 4 Humvee vehicles, 2 all-terrain vehicles and approximately 20 personnel arrived on the opposite side. The members of the enemy patrol armed their weapons and pointed them towards the Lebanese Army personnel, who carried on with their activities. The patrol left in the direction of occupied territory at 1630 hours.
29 August	1040	A team from the UNIFIL liaison unit and a Lebanese Army patrol were visiting points BP12 and BP14, opposite the town of Rumaysh. When they reached point BP14, a five-person Israeli enemy patrol arrived on the opposite side, inside occupied Palestinian territory. Two members of the enemy patrol pointed their weapons towards the UNIFIL liaison unit team and the Lebanese Army patrol. At 1230 hours, the hostile patrol left in the direction of occupied territory and the UNIFIL liaison unit team and the Lebanese Army patrol left the area at 1250 hours.

Sea violations committed in August 2018

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 August	0630	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) of 1 October 2011 for one hour and 20 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 70 metres. The crew of the launch sounded warning sirens to warn off a Lebanese fishing vessel that was inside Lebanese territorial waters and detonated two noise bombs. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	2110	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 30 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 500 metres. The crew of the launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters and sounded warning sirens, used searchlights, broadcast obscenities over loudspeakers, fired a flare and detonated two noise bombs in order to warn off a Lebanese fishing vessel that was inside Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	2129	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a five-minute period. The crew of that launch also launched a noise bomb, broadcast obscenities over loudspeakers and sounded warning sirens for 30 seconds towards Lebanese territorial waters.
	2130	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for five minutes, proceeding on its way for some 500 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
3 August	0510	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for one hour, proceeding on its way for some 105 metres. The crew of the launch used searchlights and loudspeakers, and detonated two noise bombs in order to warn off a Lebanese fishing vessel that was inside Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
4 August	0135	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for two minutes and broadcast over loudspeakers in Hebrew.
	0137	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for two minutes and broadcast over loudspeakers in Hebrew.
	0140	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for four hours and 50 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 345 metres. The crew of the launch fired two flares and used loudspeakers and searchlights in order to warn off a Lebanese fishing vessel that was inside Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
5 August	0530	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for one hour and 5 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 120 metres. The crew of the launch broadcast over loudspeakers and detonated three noise bombs to warn off a Lebanese fishing vessel that was inside Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
6 August	1018	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for six minutes, proceeding on its way for some 260 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1826	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for seven minutes, proceeding on its way for some 240 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
7 August	0450	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 12 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 350 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0505	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 25 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 370 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0947	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 28 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 296 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
8 August	0450	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for one minute and launched two noise bombs inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0506	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for two minutes, proceeding on its way for some 130 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1006	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 56 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 407 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1229	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for four minutes, proceeding on its way for some 240 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1804	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for three minutes, proceeding on its way for some 407 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
9 August	0450	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for one hour and 34 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 555 metres. The crew of the launch used loudspeakers and searchlights to warn off a Lebanese fishing vessel that was inside Lebanese territorial waters. The crew also launched four noise bombs and fired one flare. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0610	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 16 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 350 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
11 August	1907	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding on its way some 111 metres over a two-minute period before leaving in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
12 August	0525	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 50 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 90 metres. The crew of the launch used searchlights to warn off a Lebanese fishing vessel that was inside Lebanese territorial waters. The crew also launched five noise bombs and fired one flare. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1811	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding on its way some 295 metres over a three-minute period before leaving in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
14 August	0450	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 45 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 100 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0717	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for one minute, proceeding on its way for some 445 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0748 hours, it violated the boundary again for six minutes, proceeding on its way for some 500 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
15 August	0929	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for one hour and 48 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 555 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0940	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for one hour and 16 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 538 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1819	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding on its way some 482 metres over an eight-minute period before leaving in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
16 August	1910	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for five minutes, proceeding on its way for some 205 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
18 August	0215	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 15 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 375 metres. The crew of the launch used searchlights, warning sirens and loudspeakers to warn off a Lebanese fishing vessel that was inside Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0220	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for two minutes.
18 August	0232	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for two minutes.
	0238	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for one minute.
	0240	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for one minute.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1813	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 37 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 92 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
19 August	1817	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 13 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 370 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 2326 hours, it violated the boundary again for three minutes, proceeding on its way for some 482 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 2352 hours, it violated the boundary yet again for six minutes, proceeding on its way for some 500 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	2337	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for one minute.
	2355	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for four minutes.
20 August	1139	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 32 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 575 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 1823 hours, it violated the boundary again for 11 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 335 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
21 August	1821	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for three minutes, proceeding on its way for some 288 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
22 August	1756	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for five minutes, proceeding on its way for some 555 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 1838 hours, it violated the boundary again for six minutes, proceeding on its way for some 405 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
23 August	1809	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for five minutes, proceeding on its way for some 425 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
24 August	1834	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for five minutes, proceeding on its way for some 480 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
25 August	0850	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for two minutes, proceeding on its way for some 295 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1055	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for two minutes, proceeding on its way for some 407 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1102	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 26 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 480 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1135	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for four minutes, proceeding on its way for some 350 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1150	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for one minute, proceeding on its way for some 277 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	2123	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for two minutes, proceeding on its way for some 277 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
28 August	1816	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding on its way some 480 metres over a five-minute period before leaving in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
29 August	1814	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding on its way some 390 metres over a six-minute period before leaving in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
31 August	1157	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for eight minutes, proceeding on its way for some 315 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1430	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for three minutes, proceeding on its way for some 203 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1611	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 42 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 463 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	Time	Nature of violation
	1720	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 13 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 315 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Air violations committed in August 2018

Date	Time	Nature of violation
1 August	1100	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1225 hours over Rumaysh.
	1115	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1805 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1755	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2245 hours over Yarun.
2 August	1220	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1300 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1315	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. It circled over the sea west of Sidon, Khaldah, Damur and the South before leaving at 1820 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1730	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 0140 hours on 3 August over Naqurah.
3 August	0115	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0425 hours over Rumaysh.
	0825	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 2110 hours over Rumaysh.
	2050	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0410 hours on 4 August over Kafr Killa.
4 August	0400	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1115 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1530 hours over Rumaysh.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1105	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1915 hours over Rumaysh.
	1905	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0240 hours on 5 August over Yarun.
5 August	0240	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 0720 hours over Rumaysh.
	0600	The Israeli enemy operated a training aircraft inside occupied Palestinian territory between points B82 and B83, opposite Kafr Killa. At 0730 hours, the aircraft twice violated Lebanese airspace over a five-minute period before leaving at 0750 hours towards occupied territory.
	0710	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. It circled over Beirut, Ba'abda and Matn before leaving at 1645 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	0900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. It circled over Beirut, Ba'abda, Matn, Kasrawan and Jubayl before leaving at 1515 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1735	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 2120 hours over Kafr Kilia.
6 August	0750	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 2010 hours over Rumaysh.
	0800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1920 hours over Rumaysh.
	1800	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1920 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
7 August	0030	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1445 hours over Rumaysh.
	0930	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1110 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1505	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 2035 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1905	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 2130 hours over the sea off Sarafand.

Date	Time	Nature of violation
	2100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 0515 hours on 8 August over Rumaysh.
	2105	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Naqurah. They circled over Shikka, the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 2245 hours over Rumaysh.
8 August	0605	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1450 hours over Rumaysh.
	1730	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0155 hours on 9 August over Rumaysh.
9 August	0940	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 2315 hours over Rumaysh.
	1030	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over Shikka and the South before leaving at 1105 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1330	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over Batrun and the South before leaving at 1510 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2300	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0630 hours on 10 August over Rumaysh.
	2320	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the sea between Sarafand and Tyre before leaving at 0105 hours on 10 August over the sea west of Tyre.
10 August	0615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 2110 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1355	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Sidon. It circled over the sea off Sidon and to the west of Naqurah before leaving at 1505 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	2030	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa before leaving at 2300 hours over Kafr Killa.
11 August	0005	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa, Rashayya and the South before leaving at 1345 hours over Rumaysh.
	1325	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 2040 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	Time	Nature of violation
	2010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0455 hours on 12 August over Alma al-Sha'b.
12 August	0430	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0550 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0940	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1140 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the Shuf and Alayh before leaving at 1630 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1110	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1835 hours over Rumaysh.
	1825	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0540 hours on 13 August over Alma al-Sha'b.
13 August	0650	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1710 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0750	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq and Zahlah before leaving at 1825 hours over Rumaysh.
	0930	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1100 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekka, the South, Beirut and its suburbs, Ba'abda and Alayh before leaving at 2310 hours over Naqurah.
	2225	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut, Ba'abda and Matn before leaving at 0100 hours on 14 August over Naqurah.
14 August	0330	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 0940 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	0805	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1905 hours over Rumaysh.
	0905	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1125 hours over Naqurah.

Date	Time	Nature of violation
	1005	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1400 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1230	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1720 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1635	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Naqurah. It circled between Adlun and Naqurah before leaving at 1820 hours over Naqurah.
	1635	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 2225 hours over Aytarun.
	1740	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1815 hours over Yarun.
	2300	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 0020 hours on 15 August over Rumaysh.
15 August	0005	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0745 hours over Rumaysh.
	0730	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Matn, Kasrawan, Jubayl, Zahlah and Riyaq before leaving at 1815 hours over Rumaysh.
	0930	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1030 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the Western Bekaa, the Shuf, Alayh, Beirut and its suburbs, and Ba'abda before leaving at 2250 hours over Naqurah.
	2135	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 0235 hours on 16 August over Kafr Killa.
16 August	0605	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South, Beirut and its suburbs, and Ba'abda before leaving at 1545 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 0330 hours on 17 August over Naqurah.
	1250	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1350 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	Time	Nature of violation
	1805	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0230 hours on 17 August over Naqurah.
17 August	0500	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Matn, Ba'abda, Beirut and the South before leaving at 1250 hours over Rumaysh.
	0905	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1350 hours over Naqurah.
	1250	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 2320 hours over Yarun.
18 August	0100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0340 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0335	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1220 hours over Rumaysh.
	1220	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2030 hours over Rumaysh.
	2030	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0635 hours on 19 August over Rumaysh.
19 August	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Zahlah and Jubb Jannin before leaving at 1300 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1045	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1220 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1345	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Ba'abda and the South before leaving at 2225 hours over Naqurah.
	2200	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 0620 hours on 20 August over Aytarun.
20 August	0840	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. It circled over the South, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1345 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1200	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Shuba. They circled over the Shuf and the South before leaving at 1310 hours over Yarun.

Date	Time	Nature of violation
	1205	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over the Shuf and the South before leaving at 1310 hours over Yarun.
	1430	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It disappeared from radar screens over Ba'abda and reappeared over the South before leaving at 1935 hours over Rumaysh.
	2010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0305 hours on 21 August over Rumaysh.
21 August	0835	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa, the South, Beirut and its suburbs, Ba'abda and Jubayl before leaving at 2200 hours over Naqurah.
	0930	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1100 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1820	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1930 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2240	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 0700 hours on 22 August over Alma al-Sha'b.
22 August	0800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1605 hours over Rumaysh.
	1030	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Ba'abda the South before leaving at 1545 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1220	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Ba'abda, the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 0915 hours on 23 August over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2100	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2210 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
23 August	0810	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Zahlah, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1500 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0840	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1530 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1215	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They proceeded to a point above the sea west of Shikka before leaving at 1225 hours over the sea west of Shikka.

Date	Time	Nature of violation
	1245	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Shikka. They circled over Shikka and the South before leaving at 1325 hours over Naqurah.
	1515	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2300 hours over Rumaysh.
	2255	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0605 hours on 24 August over Rumaysh.
24 August	0555	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 0735 hours over Yarun.
	0715	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the Shuf before leaving at 0200 hours on 25 August over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0720	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 2030 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1125	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 1800 hours over Rumaysh.
	2030	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 0600 hours on 25 August over Rumaysh.
25 August	0930	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1150 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1120	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa, the Shuf, Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 1855 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1140	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1905 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1500	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b, and proceeded to circle between points BP5 and BP11.
	1520	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1650 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1815	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 2355 hours over Kafr Killa.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
26 August	0630	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa before leaving at 0925 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0850	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Shuba. It circled over the Western Bekaa before leaving at 0940 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1205	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1545 hours over Rumaysh.
	1320	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Shuf and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1425 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1340	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Shuf and the South before leaving at 0110 hours on 27 August over Kafr Killa.
	1440	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1555 hours over Rumaysh.
	1445	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled between Shikka and the South before leaving at 1540 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1935	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 0100 hours on 27 August over Rumaysh.
27 August	0040	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0545 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 0810 hours over Naqurah.
	0905	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Ba'abda, Alayh and the Shuf before leaving at 1415 hours over Rumaysh.
	0945	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1205 hours over Naqurah.
	1230	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 2320 hours over Yarun.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
28 August	0805	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa, the South, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1300 hours over Naqurah.
	0955	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 1930 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 0240 hours on 29 August over Aytarun.
29 August	0540	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1205 hours over Rumaysh.
	1135	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the Western Bekaa, Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 2000 hours over Naqurah.
	1240	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They left at 1250 hours over the sea west of Shikka, heading towards Turkey.
	1255	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Shikka. They left at 1305 hours over the sea west of Naqurah, heading towards Turkey.
	1305	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Shikka. They left at 1315 hours over the sea west of Naqurah, heading towards Turkey.
	1320	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the Shuf before leaving at 1910 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1955	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0030 hours on 30 August over Rumaysh.
30 August	0710	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 2125 hours over Naqurah.
	2000	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 0300 hours on 31 August over Naqurah.
31 August	0120	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Ba'abda and the South before leaving at 0730 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0730	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 2145 hours over Kafr Killa.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1415	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1540 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1445	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1740 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

United Nations S/2018/877

Security Council

Distr.: General
28 September 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 28 September 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 2432 (2018), by which the Council decided to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Mali until 30 September 2019 and requested me to take the necessary administrative measures to that effect.

Accordingly, I wish to inform you that, after consulting the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali, I have appointed the following experts:

Ms. Carolina Reyes Aragón, humanitarian affairs expert (Colombia)
Mr. Albert Barume, regional expert (Democratic Republic of the Congo)
Mr. Ruben de Koning, finance expert (Netherlands)
Mr. Aurélien Llorca, armed groups expert (France)

I have designated Mr. de Koning to serve as the Coordinator of the Panel.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

18-16190 (E) 011018

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United Nations S/2018/878

Security Council

Distr.: General
2 October 2018
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 26 September 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour, in my capacity as representative of the State chairing the one hundred and fiftieth ordinary session of the Council of the League of Arab States at the ministerial level, to attach herewith the communiqué issued by the ninth meeting of the quadripartite Arab ministerial committee tasked with following up on the crisis with Iran and means of responding to Iran's interference in the internal affairs of Arab States (see annex), held on the margins of the Council session on Tuesday, 11 September 2018.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Omer Dahab Fadl **Mohamed**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-16359 (E) 081018 081018

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Annex to the letter dated 26 September 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Communiqué issued by the ninth meeting of the quadripartite Arab ministerial committee tasked with following up on the crisis with Iran and means of responding to Iran's interference in the internal affairs of Arab States.

The quadripartite Arab ministerial committee tasked with following up on the crisis with Iran and means of responding to Iran's interference in the internal affairs of Arab States — consisting of the United Arab Emirates (Chair), the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt and His Excellency the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States — held its ninth meeting at the headquarters of the Secretariat of the League of Arab States on 11 September 2018, on the margins of the one hundred and fiftieth ordinary session of the Council of the League at the ministerial level.

The ministerial committee discussed developments in the crisis with the Islamic Republic of Iran, the course of Arab relations with Iran, and means of responding to Iran's interference in the internal affairs of Arab States. It considered the report prepared by the Secretariat, and reviewed the most egregious negative statements directed by Iranian officials against Arab States. It also considered the report of the United Arab Emirates on Iran's activities and interventions in the internal affairs of Arab States, and the steps taken to address such interventions.

The ministerial committee condemned continued Iranian interference in the internal affairs of Arab States. It deplored the provocative statements being directed by Iranian officials against Arab States. The committee also expressed deep concern about sectarian incitement being perpetrated by Iran within Arab States, including Iran's support for armed terrorist militias in certain Arab States, which was causing chaos and instability in the region, thereby threatening Arab national security and undermining regional and international efforts to resolve regional issues and crises. It called on Iran to desist from such behaviour.

The committee also condemned continued support by Iran for acts of terrorism and subversion in the Arab States, including continued launches of ballistic missiles from Yemeni territory into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in flagrant violation of Security Council resolution 2216 (2015), which provides for the need to refrain from arming the militias. The committee affirmed its support for the steps taken by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Bahrain to address those hostile acts and to maintain security and stability.

The committee deplored and condemned Iranian acts of sabotage and intervention in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Bahrain, and commended that Kingdom's efforts to combat terrorism. The Committee also welcomed the report submitted by the Kingdom of Bahrain on Iranian involvement in supporting the so-called Ashtar Brigades, a terrorist group headquartered in Iran that is working to undermine security and stability in the Kingdom. That report implicates Iran in arming that group with weapons and explosives, financing them, and providing them with training in camps sponsored by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the Hizbullah terrorist organization.

The Committee also welcomed decisions by a number of States to classify the so-called Ashtar Brigades, active in Bahrain and headquartered in Iran, as a terrorist organization, and to list several of its members as terrorists. That position reflects the

determination of the world's States to address terrorism at the regional and international levels, and to confront anyone who supports, incites or sympathizes with it; it also constitutes an expression of support for the efforts and measures taken by the Kingdom of Bahrain to promote security, stability and peace.

The committee commended the security agencies of the Kingdom of Bahrain for managing to frustrate a number of terrorist acts and conspiracies, and for apprehending 116 terrorists belonging to a terrorist organization that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and its external arms, the Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Hizbullah terrorist organizations, had worked to create, finance, train and supply with weapons and explosives so that its members could carry out a series of major terrorist acts that would undermine the security, stability and economy of the Kingdom of Bahrain.

The committee denounced continued Iranian and Turkish intervention in the Syrian crisis, which had serious repercussions for the future of Syria and its sovereignty, security, stability, national unity and territorial integrity, and stressed that such intervention was detrimental to efforts to resolve the Syrian crisis through peaceful means in accordance with the outcomes of the first Geneva conference.

The committee expressed solidarity with the decision by the Kingdom of Morocco to cut off diplomatic relations with Iran because of dangerous and unacceptable attempts by the latter and its ally the terrorist Hizbullah organization to interfere in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Morocco by arming and training operatives to threaten the security and stability of Morocco, yet one more manifestation of Iran's tactic of undermining regional security and stability.

The committee also expressed its condemnation of direct Iranian threats to international maritime navigation in the Arab Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, as well as threats to international navigation in the Red Sea by Iran's proxies in the region, including the recent attack by the terrorist Houthi militia on a Saudi Arabian oil tanker in the Bab al-Mandab strait, which constituted a violation of the principles of international law.

The committee expressed its concern about the Iranian nuclear programme, including regarding the genuineness of Iran's commitment to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and questioned the capacity of that agreement to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons in the future, particularly in the light of Iran's hostile policies in the region. The committee underscored the need to monitor developments in that regard.

The committee condemned Iran's continued development of its ballistic missile programme and provision of missiles to the Houthis. It condemned the launch of Iranian-made missiles during attacks by the terrorist Houthi militia against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, including the launch of 190 ballistic missiles at several Saudi Arabian cities, including the capital Riyadh, which had earned widespread Arab and international condemnation. The committee stressed that such attacks constituted a major threat to security and stability in the region. It also stressed the need for Iran to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) regarding its missile programme, and the need for an effective mechanism for verification of implementation of the agreement, including inspection, monitoring, and prompt and effective reinstatement of sanctions should Iran violate its obligations under the agreement. The committee also stressed the importance of Iran acceding to all nuclear safety instruments and paying heed to environmental problems in the region, and the provisions of that resolution prohibiting Iran from conducting ballistic tests or developing long-range missiles or missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

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Security Council

Distr.: General
28 September 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 27 September 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to bring to your attention the report of the detailed findings of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar, dated 17 September (A/HRC/39/CRP.2).

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Karen **Pierce**

18-16194 (E) 011018

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United Nations S/2018/880

Security Council

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Letter dated 1 October 2018 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you the attached press release on an important three-point consensus reached at an informal meeting among China, Myanmar and Bangladesh, which was held on 27 September 2018, during the high-level week of the seventy-third session of the General Assembly (see annex).

I would be most grateful if you could circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ma** Zhaoxu
Ambassador, Permanent Representative
of China to the United Nations

18-16249 (E) 031018

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Annex to the letter dated 1 October 2018 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

An important three-point consensus reached at an informal meeting among China, Myanmar and Bangladesh

Press release
28 September 2018, New York

On September 27, 2018 local time, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi held a trilateral informal meeting with Minister for the Office of the State Counsellor U Kyaw Tint Swe of Myanmar and Foreign Minister Abul Hassan Mahmud Ali of Bangladesh at the United Nations (UN) Headquarters in New York. UN Secretary-General António Guterres was present at invitation.

Wang Yi expressed that I held an informal meeting with two ministers in Beijing this June, during which China, Myanmar and Bangladesh reached a four-point principled consensus on properly resolving the Rakhine issue. The Rakhine issue involves a complicated history, and its proper resolution will be in the common interests of Myanmar and Bangladesh and also benefit regional peace and stability. Wang Yi said that the Rakhine issue is essentially an issue involving Myanmar and Bangladesh, and the Chinese side is not in support of approaches that tend to complicate, worsen, and internationalize the issue. It is hoped that Myanmar and Bangladesh will overcome difficulties, meet each other halfway and find solutions to the issue through friendly consultations. The priority is to achieve the first repatriation of the people who fled from the Rakhine State in Myanmar to Bangladesh. The Chinese side, as a friendly neighboring country of Myanmar and Bangladesh, is willing to continue setting up platforms for communication and consultations between Myanmar and Bangladesh, and continue providing humanitarian aid for displaced persons from the Rakhine State to return to their homeland.

Wang Yi said that the international community including the UN could play a constructive role in this regard. The Chinese side appreciates the active efforts made by the UN institutions and Secretary-General António Guterres.

The meeting was held in a friendly, candid and constructive atmosphere, with a three-point consensus reached. First, Myanmar and Bangladesh agreed to properly solve the Rakhine issue through friendly consultations. Second, the Bangladeshi side said it is prepared to repatriate the first group of displaced persons fled from Myanmar's Rakhine State to Bangladesh, while the Myanmar side said it is prepared to receive them. Third, Myanmar and Bangladesh agreed to hold a joint working group meeting as soon as possible so as to work out a roadmap and timetable for the repatriation and achieve the first repatriation as early as possible.

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Letter dated 28 September 2018 from the Permanent Representatives of Peru, Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Peru and Sweden, as Co-Chairs of the Informal Expert Group on Women and Peace and Security, and in close cooperation with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, hereby transmit the summary of the meeting of the Informal Expert Group held on 13 April 2018 on the situation in Libya (see annex).

We would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Gustavo **Meza-Cuadra**
Permanent Representative of Peru to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Olof **Skoog**
Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Karen **Pierce**
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations

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Annex to the letter dated 28 September 2018 from the Permanent Representatives of Peru, Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Informal Expert Group on Women and Peace and Security

Summary of the meeting on the situation in Libya, 13 April 2018

On 13 April 2018, the Informal Expert Group on Women and Peace and Security held a meeting on the situation in Libya. Members of the Security Council were briefed by the United Nations Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Deputy Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Maria do Valle Ribeiro, accompanied by experts from UNSMIL and the United Nations country team.

Member States asked questions related to women's political participation, including in the implementation of the United Nations Action Plan for Libya, the constitutional drafting assembly, the National Conference and the elections; their participation in public institutions dealing with peace and security issues; recent trends in sexual and gender-based violence, including against female migrants, and on trafficking, forced labour and modern-day slavery; and the United Nations engagement and work with women's civil society organizations, leaders and human rights defenders.

Below are the main points raised in the briefing:

- The Deputy Special Representative noted that UNSMIL was mandated to take fully into account a gender perspective throughout its mandate and to assist the Government of National Accord in ensuring the full and effective participation of women in the democratic transition, reconciliation efforts, the security sector and in national institutions. In that regard, she emphasized that women must be included in developing a new narrative for Libya and participate fully in the public domain, particularly in the organization of elections in 2018, which is a critical aspect of the United Nations Action Plan for Libya.
- While there have been encouraging developments, including a positive trend in women's engagement in various political and social processes, overall concerns regarding the political, economic and security situation for women in Libya remain. UNSMIL remains actively engaged in advocating and supporting women's participation in Libyan society.
- Women's representation in the Government of National Accord is currently at 16 per cent, with three women in decision-making roles, including a State Minister of Women's Affairs and Community Development, the Minister of Social Affairs and the Minister of Institutional Reform. There is currently no quota for women's public representation. The United Nations and women's organizations continue to advocate a minimum of 30 per cent representation.
- There are no women on the nine-member Presidency Council. The Presidency Council has established a Women's Support and Empowerment Unit that reports to the Prime Minister. The Ministries of Education, Labour and Economy have also established similar units. The units will help to mainstream a gender perspective throughout Libyan institutions.
- Women representatives were part of the joint drafting committee for the Libyan Political Agreement amendment process and reviewed the draft constitutional proposal. They will present their recommendations to the House of

Representatives and the High Council of State. The draft constitution represents an advancement for the rights of women and gender equality. In normative terms, however, other discriminatory elements remain, such as the ability for women to confer citizenship to her children.

- The security situation has a negative effect on the mobility of women, which risks affecting women's participation in the election as voters and as candidates. Women account for approximately 45 per cent of newly registered voters. A national survey found, however, that only 55 per cent of women are likely to vote.

- As part of the national reconciliation project, UNSMIL facilitated four local dialogues, leading to the signing of local reconciliation agreements between tribes and communities previously in conflict. Separately, UNSMIL held a meeting to discuss rape in tribal and conservative environments.

- The women's agenda for peace, developed by women from all regions of Libya in 2015, was launched nationally by women's groups on International Women's Day in 2018. Women experts and academics from Benghazi who participated in drafting the agenda are meeting with the legislation committee of the High Council of State to share proposed legislation related to gender equality.

- UNSMIL is working with partners, including through the humanitarian dialogue, to develop an inclusive consultative process to lay the foundation for the National Conference. The participation of Libyan women in the National Conference is essential.

- Young Libyan women are showing an increased interest in political participation. Events aimed at young people feature substantially broader participation of women making substantive contributions.

- Libya has not yet enacted specific legislation to criminalize domestic violence. The penal code addresses some forms of gender-based violence. However, the law currently exonerates rapists if they marry their victims. A subcluster for partners, which includes civil society and non-governmental organizations, has recently been established to address gender-based violence.

- During migration, widespread sexual violence against women and girls is committed by many different actors, including by criminal networks, traffickers, members of the police and the coast guard and in detention centres. This situation is coupled with a prevailing climate of impunity and a lack of access to health-care services, psychosocial support and safe spaces.

- The International Criminal Court continues to collect information relating to crimes allegedly committed against migrants in transit through Libya, but progress is slow. UNSMIL has engaged with the Prosecutor General on those matters. UNSMIL is concerned that arrest warrants have been issued for migrants rather than for members of the organized criminal networks who are profiting from smuggling and trafficking in persons. UNSMIL monitoring shows that migrants who pass through Libya are systematically coerced into forced labour.

The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict highlighted the need for accountability for the wide spectrum of perpetrators of sexual violence in Libya. In this regard, the Office called for dedicated expertise to support the mission in the form of women's protection advisers. The Office recalled Decree 119 of 2014 of the Council of Ministers by which victims of sexual violence are recognized as victims of war, which is crucial for reparations and legal support for survivors. In addition, advocacy is needed for women and girls who

have escaped from captivity by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant to ensure they are not treated as affiliates or intelligence assets and receive the care, reparations and support that they require.

The United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), as the secretariat of the Informal Expert Group, noted the importance of gender analysis, including regarding the role of women and young women in peacebuilding processes and understanding the drivers of participation, conflict and opportunities for peace. UN-Women also noted the importance of ensuring that civil society participation and gender expertise on elections and constitutional reform were available to the Mission, the country team and political stakeholders on the ground. The secretariat of the Informal Expert Group shared the following recommendations with the group in writing:

- The Security Council should take every opportunity to ask questions about the implementation of the Action Plan of UNSMIL and resolution, specifically on: (a) measures taken to assist key actors and institutions in ensuring the full and effective participation of women in the democratic transition, reconciliation efforts and the security sector, as mandated by resolution 2376 (2017); (b) efforts to integrate a gender analysis and perspective in the overall implementation and monitoring of the Action Plan; (c) specific attention to women's participation in all preparations and meetings of the National Conference; and (d) the availability of financial resources and expertise to implement these efforts.
- The Security Council should call upon the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to report regularly to the Security Council on his engagement with women-led civil society organizations, women peace activists and women human rights defenders, and to suggest the establishment of a mechanism for periodic consultation with a diverse representation of women's groups on activities related to conflict resolution, peacebuilding, disarmament, counterterrorism, security plans, human rights and the provision of humanitarian assistance.
- The Security Council should urge the Government to adopt quotas to ensure a minimum of 30 per cent representation by women in all governance bodies, including those emerging from the political transition, and should express its support for the recognition of victims of sexual violence as victims of war.
- The Security Council should call for the deployment of dedicated expertise, such as women's protection advisers, to accelerate the implementation of the monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements on conflict-related sexual violence.
- The Security Council should call for increased documentation and reporting by the United Nations on sexual and gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence, and consider listing individuals and entities involved in serious human rights abuses within the United Nations sanctions regime for Libya.
- The United Nations and the Government should prioritize the development and implementation of a comprehensive disarmament strategy that includes a gender perspective and the participation of women.
- The Government should ensure the effective protection of women and girls, including victims of trafficking, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and detainees, and women peace activists and women human rights defenders who may be particularly targeted. This must include urgent measures to improve the conditions and rights of women held in detention, from adequate facilities and

female personnel to broader gender-sensitive security sector reform, humanitarian access and judicial review. Monitoring and investigations of human rights violations, including sexual and gender-based violence, should be conducted with the support of, and in consultation with, civil society organizations and consider the safety, dignity and long-term needs of survivors and their families. The efforts should include the prosecution of perpetrators of conflict-related sexual violence and full cooperation with the International Criminal Court.

- The Government and its international partners should redouble their efforts in implementing large-scale programmes, including through reparations, for the psychosocial and economic rehabilitation of women and girls affected by the conflict, such as sexual violence survivors, women and girls disabled because of the war and ongoing insecurity, or affected by displacement, arbitrary detention or the loss of family members.

- The Government should provide adequate resources and staff to the Women's Support and Empowerment Unit of the Presidency Council and similar units established in other ministries.

- The United Nations and other international partners should assist the Government of Libya and civil society actors in the collection and dissemination of sex-disaggregated data and gender analysis, including on the drivers of radicalization and violent extremism and the impact of counterterrorism.

The Co-Chairs closed the meeting, thanking the Deputy Special Representative, UNSMIL and the country team for their participation, and expressed their intention to convene a follow-up meeting of the Informal Expert Group on Women and Peace and Security to discuss the situation in Libya before the end of the year.